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Introduction
Filippo Dionigi 
Filippo Dionigi is Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the Middle East Centre, London School of 
Economics and Political Science.
The Arab Uprisings of  2011 set events in motion that have vastly changed the Middle 
East and North Africa region (MENA), not only through organised protest and violent 
conflict, but also through migration and demographic change. The Syrian conflict has 
forcibly displaced more than 11 million people – half  of  the country’s population. 6.5 
million are internally displaced, while 5 million have crossed the border to find refuge 
abroad, in neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, and 
elsewhere both regionally and globally. 
In a workshop held on 17–18 June 2016, the LSE Middle East Centre brought together a 
diverse group of  people (policymakers from host states, representatives from international 
organisations, academics and NGOs practitioners) to explore the effects of  the Syrian 
refugee emergency on Arab host states such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. This volume 
brings together a set of  papers presented at the workshop. It also presents a list of  key 
recommendations relevant for all stakeholders and agreed upon by participants.
A number of  interrelated themes emerged during the workshop. Government represen-
tatives, including Hayder Mustafa Saaid, highlighted that host states – in particular local 
communities – are under unprecedented pressure, dealing with a situation that strains 
resources and infrastructures already insufficient for the autochthonous population. 
Humanitarian actors, such as Mireille Girard, emphasised that the refugee population 
is becoming increasingly poor and fragile. This is because, amongst other things, new 
policies and regulations have narrowed the protection space for refugees, and because 
international donors’ support has been intermittent.
Another theme revolves around the argument that refugees are not merely passive recip-
ients of  aid and services. This argument is not new, but it has become prominent in the 
context of  long-term displacement. Rana Khoury proposes an analysis of  Syrians’ capac-
ity to organise collectively. In their paper, Nasser Yassin and Jana Chammaa highlight 
how informal networks on which refugees and host communities rely constitute a poten-
tial untapped resource; and Géraldine Chatelard analyses the issue of  refugees’ right to 
work in host states.
An important point was made concerning the legal status of  refugees in host countries, 
which is something that shapes refugee–state relations. The laws that concern refugees in 
these countries are often ambivalent and sometimes arbitrary, but states that are not signa-
tories of  the 1951 Refugee Convention still have responsibilities towards refugees. Ghida 
Frangieh sheds light on the limits of  the Memoranda of  Understanding that UNHCR and 
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host states have established to regulate some of  the aspects concerning refugee presence 
in Jordan and Lebanon. Kelsey Norman provides an overview of  the regional dynamics 
regarding state responsibility towards refugees. Zahra Albarazi draws attention to the 
legal loopholes that cause statelessness or make stateless refugees a particularly vulnerable 
category. 
As Rochelle Davis observes, there is a need to engage more thoroughly with the analysis 
of  statistical evidence to develop a finer definition of  vulnerability. Davis highlights that 
the population of  Syrian men of  conscription age is particularly affected by the conflict in 
Syria and yet they are less protected and often discriminated against by ‘frontline states’ 
as well as resettlement states. 
Dawn Chatty warns us that we cannot appreciate the full complexity of  the issue with-
out considering it from a historical and transborder point of  view. The Middle East has 
experienced several mass migrations and refugee crises in past centuries, and these have 
established patterns that shape today’s migratory movements and host states’ policies 
towards refugees. Finally, François Reybet-Degat calls for the need to put the regional 
context into global perspective. Neighbouring countries are providing a valuable public 
good to the global community by taking direct responsibility for a suffering population, 
which should be met with global responsibility. Nevertheless, there is widespread reluc-
tance towards burden-sharing.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the speakers, authors and everyone who 
participated in the workshop discussions, as well as the LSE Impact Fund, whose funding 
made the event possible. Both refugees and host communities have thus far shown aston-
ishing levels of  resilience and patience. However, their endurance is not without limits. 
Efforts towards conflict resolution have made little progress, and 6 years on, the conflict 
has become protracted. The most effective way of  tackling the Syrian refugee emergency 
is, first and foremost, by ending the conflict in Syria. Yet, while the crisis continues, it is 
crucial to explore new perspectives and stimulate debate on how to enhance the lives and 
conditions of  refugees and host communities alike.
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Key Recommendations
Empower Informal Networks
• Formal institutions and organisations should acknowledge the importance of  infor-
mal networks within refugee and host communities for their potential as a source of 
information gathering and knowledge production that is more inclusive of  marginal-
ised voices. 
•  Resources should be allocated to research these networks, map their presence and 
survey their operational structure.
• Stakeholders should consider the complementarity between formal and informal net-
works and to reflect on previous shortcomings. 
• Instant messaging platforms, for example WhatsApp, are important tools for fast in-
formation spreading. Voice messages on these platforms are used to bypass literacy 
issues.
• All actors involved should look beyond the obvious local figureheads to reach out to 
the displaced population. 
• Local governmental authorities (municipalities, governorates), in collaboration with 
the central authorities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, may bridge between distant 
INGOs and informal community networks.
Consolidate the Legal Status of Refugees in Neighbouring 
Countries
• Refugees in host states are particularly vulnerable due to the lack of  clear legal status. 
In particular, the complexity of  acquiring medium-term stay is highlighted – leaving 
the displaced in a precarious position. Obtaining clear legal status would facilitate 
good relations between displaced populations and public institutions.
• There is a need for increased awareness of  bilateral agreements between countries of 
origin and host countries. 
• State authorities should adopt regulations that recognise a uniform legal status for all 
persons unable to return to Syria for the time being. This status should allow access to 
an automatic and inexpensive stay permit, where applicable. 
• There should be awareness of  the difficulties for the displaced population in accessing 
civil registration procedures and documentation in host states. Thus, state authorities 
should facilitate these procedures, ensuring the long-term documentation of  the dis-
placed as Syrian nationals. 
• It is important to notice that obstacles and complexities to accessing civil registration 
procedures in host states and inside Syria may create new generations of  stateless per-
sons. Preventing statelessness now will remove obstacles to voluntary return at a later 
stage, hence avoiding permanent displacement. 
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• The protection needs of  particularly vulnerable groups in the displaced communities, 
for example stateless displaced, need to be addressed and these groups should have 
access to legal stay and registrations.
• Grace periods should be adopted to allow refugees the time to regularise their status 
without incurring fines.
• It is crucial to raise awareness among the displaced population itself  about the impor-
tance of  civil registration, for example marriages, births and deaths. 
Exploit the Potential of Refugees’ Social Capital
• Refugees are the repositories of  social capital made of  social networks, reciprocity 
and trust. The humanitarian community should better consult people on the ground 
rather than apply the same template to different refugee groups in order to under-
stand the social world of  refugees. 
• Given their ability to draw upon local networks and knowledge, but also acknowl-
edging their peaceful political intent and capacity for collective action, activists in the 
refugee community can be active stakeholders – not just conduits – in developmental 
projects and humanitarian relief.
• The gap should be bridged between formal and informal education, through both 
strengthening the informal realm and providing a way for students to transition into 
the formal system.
• Empirical evidence-based studies should be conducted to demonstrate the positive 
economic impact of  the refugees’ presence in host countries. By transferring their 
capital and skill to the host society, refugees can also be a resource.
• Stakeholders are urged to see refugees as people with skills and connections that they 
can and do use to develop aid programmes.
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Expand the Possibility to Work for Displaced People in Host 
Countries
• The issue of  job creation and the possibility of  Syrians working has to be seen in the 
context of  the economic situation of  the host country. It has to be acknowledged that 
the broader economic situation can be improved, which in turn can create employ-
ment opportunities for both hosts and refugees. The ‘Do No Harm’ approach also 
points towards the importance of  creating jobs for both hosts and refugees. Further-
more, this approach would lead to less competition between groups for jobs in the 
long-term. 
• Promoting this principle needs multi-faceted international investment encompassing 
direct investment (especially for the private sector), grants, access to concessional fi-
nance on favourable terms, as well as facilitating access to international markets for 
host country exports. This, however, will go hand in hand with commitment by the 
host country to progressively review labour regulations (to permit refugees easier ac-
cess to employment) and to ensure that the business and investment environments are 
favourable. The mechanism through which such commitments are delivered should 
not be overly legalistic and thereby jeopardise the overall intent of  such a framework 
by restricting the potential for adaption as the understanding of  the context evolves.
• It is important to acknowledge the need for an optimal balance between informal and 
formal labour sectors. While the number of  work permits granted to refugees can be 
increased over time, an overly legalistic approach to the labour market in the short-
term (i.e. enforcement of  strict compliance) may reduce job opportunities and harm 
small businesses. Expanding opportunities for refugees to work legally will decrease 
the necessity to adopt negative coping mechanisms (e.g. child labour). 
Expand the Definition of Vulnerability 
• There should be awareness of  the specific vulnerability of  those attempting to flee 
Syria but who are unable to do so due to restrictions on access to residency, assistance 
and resettlement – in particular, men who are of  conscription age. 
• The popular conception of  ‘vulnerable’ as a reference primarily to women and chil-
dren is misleading. The category ‘vulnerable’ should be expanded to include men of 
conscription age who have decidedly refused to engage in military activity.
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Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: A Turning Point?
Mireille Girard
Mireille Girard is United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Representative in Lebanon.
The Syrian conflict, now into its sixth year, has caused an unprecedented crisis, generating 
4.8 million refugees throughout the region and directly affecting 13.5 million people within 
Syria. The war next door has had a profound impact on Lebanon, with ramifications for 
the country’s security, economy and society. The Lebanese people and institutions have 
opened their doors to more than one million Syrian refugees, while responding to their 
needs and those of  the host communities. It has proven to be challenging to offer quality 
public services like education or primary health care for both the Lebanese – especially 
the most impoverished – and the Syrians whom they host.
Against this backdrop, and after years in exile, the situation for Syrian refugees in Leba-
non is deteriorating rapidly. With their savings depleted, they have entered a vicious circle 
of  extreme poverty, leaving them with barely enough for daily survival. More than 70 
percent now live below the national poverty line of  $4 a day, and most have racked up 
debts of  up to $940 per family, just to afford the most basic items, such as food, medicine 
and rent. 
The Lebanese, too, have been seriously affected by the Syrian conflict, with their economy 
depressed and unemployment rising, especially among the young. A recent World Bank 
report suggested that Lebanon’s GDP growth is projected to remain sluggish through 
2016 due to the continuing Syrian crisis, the complicated domestic political situation and 
other factors like the negative impact of  weak oil prices.
As the crisis endures, what was initiated as a short-term humanitarian intervention has 
transformed into a medium-term operation. With all that comes more complicated pro-
gramme structure and management, and an increased prevalence of  troubling issues. For 
refugees, these might be socio-economic – just one example would be child labour. At 
the same time, interactions with host communities and the authorities also become more 
complex over time.
The support from the international community has been unwavering; since 2013, more 
than $3.4 billion has been allocated to Lebanon, and 40,000 refugees have been submitted 
from Lebanon for resettlement to other countries. Despite this, the assistance unfortu-
nately remains insufficient when set against stretched resources and growing needs. The 
Lebanese government and its humanitarian partners have requested $2.48 billion in the 
2016 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), the main appeal for funding from the inter-
national community. Half  way through the year, we have reached well below half  of  the 
financing for our programme.
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A political solution to the crisis in Syria is long overdue. It would stop the outflow of  refu-
gees from Syria and would relieve the strain placed on host communities in neighbouring 
countries like Turkey, which hosts 2.7 million Syrian refugees and has been a crossroads 
for those trying to flee the violence. 
Of  course, most refugees want to go back, safely, to the homeland from which they were 
torn. This is what humanitarian workers hear every day: the refugees are fully aware that 
their stay in Lebanon is temporary – just for the time they need to be protected.
In the meantime, Syrian refugees need to survive in exile and those hosting them must be 
supported, be they Lebanese families aiding Syrians, or the institutions that are providing 
the much-needed basic services. Humanitarian assistance is never sufficient, stabilisa-
tion support is also required. The Supporting Syria and the Region Conference, held in 
London in February 2016, showed that the international community and host countries 
in the region are mobilising to tackle the crisis together with additional resources and ini-
tiatives. In total $12 billion of  new money was pledged through 2020.
Support for Lebanon’s economy and infrastructure would help generate employment for 
those most in need in impoverished areas, including Syrians in sectors where they have 
traditionally filled demand and do not compete with Lebanese workers. This would help 
them meet their basic survival needs and pay their bills. Maintaining their legal residency 
status in Lebanon is a major concern of  refugees. At the moment, over half  of  Syrian ref-
ugees are unable to renew their residency because of  the cost and the documents required. 
They just wish to stay afloat and keep their papers in order.
Beyond immediate survival, resettlement to a third country is one solution, and it is ongo-
ing. Last year, countries doubled the number of  places available for Syrian refugees to 
leave Lebanon. Resettlement is a safety net for the most vulnerable, including those who 
have survived torture or trauma, female heads of  households or people with a serious 
illness that cannot be treated locally. UNHCR is asking the international community to 
multiply the number of  opportunities for refugees outside the region, including through 
scholarships, work permits, family reunifications and other temporary humanitarian 
admission schemes.
Everyone – not least the refugees themselves – agrees that the main solution for refugees 
will be to return home when conditions allow. And the refugees will be eager to take that 
path once it is safe to do so. Over the decades, UNHCR has helped more than 40 mil-
lion refugees return home. UNHCR support goes beyond assisting refugees in exile; the 
ultimate goal is always to find solutions. Peace in Syria will trigger substantial assistance 
programmes from UNHCR and other aid actors to help refugees go back to Syria and 
facilitate their reintegration at home for several years after their return.
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Syrian Refugees and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Hayder Mustafa Saaid
Hayder Mustafa Saaid is Director General of  Development, Coordination and Cooperation at the 
Ministry of  Planning, Kurdistan Regional Government, Iraq.
There are around 250,000 Syrian refugees in the Kurdistan Region of  Iraq (KRI), who 
constitute 98 percent of  all Syrian refugees in Iraq. This is in addition to the 1.5 million 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Region. Together, they account for 28 percent 
of  the increase in the population of  the Region. This represents a far higher proportional 
inflow than other receiving countries, and implies a dramatic change in the composition 
of  the population and the very fabric of  society, bringing with it tremendous challenges 
of  integration. This is particularly due to the fact that IDPs come from different religious 
and ethnic backgrounds – Christians, Yezidis, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Integrating such 
diverse groups is extremely challenging.
Before making their way to safety, Syrian refugee and IDP women and girls have been 
subjected to gross human rights abuses including abductions, trafficking, torture, forced 
marriage and other forms of  sexual and gender-based violence, which have led to serious 
psychological distress. 
Since more than 75 percent of  refugees and IDPs are women and children, it has ren-
dered women responsible to provide for and protect their children, further heightening 
their vulnerability. As might be expected, the economic and social impact on the KRI 
of  the influx of  so many people in such a short period of  time has been tremendous. A 
recent report by the World Bank concludes that the overall stabilisation cost of  the inflow 
of  refugees and IDPs was at least $1.4 billion for 2015.1
When the ongoing fiscal crisis brought about by the drop in oil prices and lack of  budget-
ary transfers from Baghdad has added to the refugee and IDP crisis, the report estimates 
that the drop in the growth rate of  the KRI between 2013 and 2014 amounts to 5 percent. 
Host communities in the Region that have generously opened their homes to the refugees 
are plunging into poverty. All indications show that the decline was even greater in 2015. 
The poverty rate increased from 3.5 percent in 2012 to 12.5 percent in 2014.
Given the injection of  resources by the Ministry of  Natural Resources of  the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG), the provision of  basic services to refugees and IDPs has 
been possible. This and other steps taken by the KRG have ensured that basic human-
itarian needs of  the refugees and IDPs have – so far – been met. There has been an 
integration of  these groups into the population at large, especially into urban areas: only 
1  ‘The Kurdistan Region of  Iraq: Assessing the Economic and Social Impact of  the Syrian Con-
flict and ISIS’, The World Bank (April 2015). Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/2015/04/24381228/kurdistan-region-iraq-assessing-economic-social-impact-syrian-conflict-isis#. 
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a third of  the refugees and 20 percent of  IDPs are still living in the 42 camps set up 
throughout the KRI. They have equal rights with the host population in these communi-
ties with regards to access to clean water, electricity and security. However, the significant 
demand pressures created by the influx have affected the provision of  health, education 
and social protection programmes to the population in general, as well as the provision of 
water, waste management and electricity. 
While this level of  settlement is an illustration of  the commitment of  the KRG to support 
refugees and IDPs under highly strained circumstances, further improvement in the well-
being of  the displaced – not to mention helping those still to come – will not be possible 
without additional resources from the international community and an improvement in 
economic conditions. The above-mentioned World Bank report notes that: ‘the KRG is 
not in a position to bear alone the financial costs of  the Syrian refugee and IDP influx, 
including those for the education sector’. The report projects stabilisation costs in 2015 
of  $846 million for human development (health, education, food security, poverty and 
shelter) and $536 million for infrastructure (electricity, transport, solid waste management 
and water), for a total of  close to $1.4 billion (these are baseline estimates; the highest 
estimate is $2.5 billion). More work is needed to consolidate the camps and to ensure their 
sustainability as a settlement.
In the 2016–2017 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), the UN Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) estimates that Iraq requires $298 million for refugee expenditures and resil-
ience in 2016.2 Given that nearly all Syrian refugees in Iraq are found in the KRI, this is 
for all intents and purposes the requirement for the KRI. 
When these needs are placed against the dire economic situation facing the KRI as a 
whole, our message is simple: the economic recovery and stability of  the KRI and the 
wellbeing of  the Syrian refugee population in the region cannot be separated. A further 
deterioration of  the economic conditions will make it impossible for the government of 
the KRI to meet the basic needs of  refugees and IDPs. More importantly, it will neces-
sitate a scaling back of  the war against Islamic State (IS), potentially leading to gains in 
territory by the group and a further increase in the number of  Syrian and Iraqi refugees 
fleeing the region entirely to add to pressures on absorption by Europe and other Middle 
Eastern countries.
Instead of  viewing the refugees and IDPs as a burden, the KRG can view them as a cru-
cial resource in increasing the economic vibrancy of  the KRI. However, given the current 
situation of  the KRI’s economy, international financial support is needed to kick-start the 
process. A recent assessment of  needs by the organisation REACH identifies food security, 
employment, education, health and sanitation as the greatest needs of  IDPs outside of 
camps.3 Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable.
2 ‘Iraq – Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2016–2017’, UNHCR. Available at: http://
www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Iraq-%E2%80%93-Regional-Refugee-Resil-
ience-Plan-2016-2017.pdf.
3  ‘Quarterly IDP Camp Directory: Comparative Dashboard & Camp Profiles Iraq’, Reach (April 2016).
Available at: http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_fact-
sheet_comparative_directory_april2016.pdf.
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As the Syrian crisis approaches its sixth year, we need innovative solutions, now more than 
ever. The KRG, in cooperation with the federal government of  Iraq and the international 
community, is committed to making the humanitarian response in our region more effec-
tive and sustainable, thus addressing the plight of  the large number of  Syrian refugees 
and IDPs we are hosting.
International support for an investment-led economic recovery of  the KRI will help in 
the following six ways:
1. Given that the unemployment rate has been increasing in the region, the integration 
of  refugees into economic activity would require the creation of  new private sector 
jobs, with an injection of  new investment and funds to allow resumption of  existing 
projects. This will help ensure that both the host population and refugees will have 
access to livelihoods.
2. Historically in many countries, newly arrived people have proven to be the most entre-
preneurial. With enough funds to train and provide small loans and other assistance 
to entrepreneurs, the refugees would be able to not only create their own demand for 
labour, but also contribute to the private sector led economic growth of  the region.
3. As mentioned above, the influx of  refugees and IDPs has created a severe strain on 
existing infrastructure – power, water, schools and hospitals. Investment funds that 
allow the initiation of  infrastructure projects can also provide jobs in construction and 
other sectors for many refugees.
4. In particular, funds for the construction of  schools will increase the educational ca-
pacity and allow children of  refugees to be accommodated. In other words, invest-
ment in human capital can proceed alongside investment in physical capital.
5. Programmes and jobs would improve the resilience of  women and girls, thereby pri-
oritising a smart strategy for stabilisation and addressing the needs and rights of  the 
most marginalised and vulnerable among refugees and host populations, as well as 
increasing family and community resilience.
6. Lastly, discussions have taken place to deliver humanitarian assistance through mul-
tipurpose cash assistance, which allows the displaced population to assess their own 
needs and will support the local economy through their expenditure.
Unless the international community acts to shore up the economy of  the KRI, it is very 
likely that, in a few months’ time, a much bigger wave of  people will make their way to the 
EU and other countries; not only Syrian refugees but also IDPs and perhaps even people 
from the Kurdistan Region itself.
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Refugees’ Contentious Politics and the Case of Syrian 
Activists in Jordan
Rana B. Khoury
Rana B. Khoury is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Northwestern University. 
In the wake of  multiple civil wars throughout the 1990s, analysts came to associate 
cross-border warfare and the spread of  civil wars with refugee violence. In the last decade 
of  massive displacement from Syria and Iraq, activism among refugees is evident, but 
violence much less so. As conflicts in the Middle East bring the worldwide toll of  refugees 
to record highs, can our conceptualisations account for different types of  refugee-related 
politics? I propose a unified conceptual framework that foregrounds the displaced as 
claim-makers excluded from formal politics, and generates types of  refugee contention 
along key dimensions. A description of  one type – activism – among Syrians in Jordan 
illustrates this form of  politics and suggests how policymakers can approach the agency 
of  refugees. 
The analytical divide that has long existed between those who view refugees as purveyors 
of  violence, and those who view refugees as subjects of  violence, is increasingly overcome 
by our recognition of  the displaced as political agents, even if  refugee flows constitute 
legitimate security threats.1 Nevertheless, the concepts invoked to capture these agential 
potentialities are often made to travel too far, their meanings broadened and their preci-
sion reduced.2 For instance, scholars have used the term ‘social movements’ to describe 
efforts to acquire healthcare and education, rather than mass episodes of  contention.3 
Similarly, cases of  what are described as ‘refugee warriors’,4 include everything from local 
defence units to genocidaires.5 
Such conceptual stretching has occurred in the absence of  a unified approach to replace 
the victim/warrior paradigms. I propose a new framework – contentious politics – that 
accounts for refugee agency but also for disparities in power between them and powerful 
authorities. Contention is the collective actions of  claim-makers on systems of  authority 
1  Robert Muggah and Edward Mogire, ‘Arms Availability and Refugee Militarization in Africa: Con-
ceptualizing the Issues’, in Michael Brzoska and Robert Muggah (eds), No Refuge: The Crisis of  Refugee 
Militarization in Africa (London and New York: Zed Books, 2006), p. 5.
2  Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, American Political Science Review 
64/4 (1970), pp. 1033–53.
3  John L. Hammond, ‘War-Uprooting and the Political Mobilization of  Central American Refugees’, 
Journal of  Refugee Studies 6/2 (1993), pp. 105–22. Navine Murshid, The Politics of  Refugees in South Asia: 
Identity, Resistance, and Manipulation (London and New York: Routledge, 2014).
4  Sergio Aguayo, Astri Surke and Aristide R. Zolberg, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in 
the Developing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
5  Those who commit genocide.
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through non-institutional channels. In the first instance, refugees are outside institutional 
channels because their relationship with the state has been severed and they are deprived 
of  the associated protections of  citizenship.6 Although the international refugee regime 
pursues protection for refugees, in fact many remain excluded from formal politics due to 
the vast variation in legal protection afforded by countries of  first asylum and the elusive-
ness of  the three durable solutions – repatriation, resettlement and local integration – the 
corollary of  which is protracted situations, of  which there were 33 in 2014 accounting for 
nearly half  of  refugees worldwide.7 
Accordingly, I propose a descriptive typology of  refugees’ contentious behaviour that 
takes as its starting point refugees as claim-makers in exclusion.8 Form and organisation 
are the principle dimensions of  variation in refugees’ contention, as depicted in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive Typology of Refugees’ Contentious Behaviour
Forms of Contention
Violent Nonviolent
Degree of Organisation High Transnational warfare Social movement
Moderate Militarisation Activism
Low Everyday resistance
The form of  contention is shaped by repertoires that are common in a society’s history9 or 
prominent elsewhere.10 For example, in the 1960s and 70s, Palestinian refugees deployed 
armed struggle as they looked upon anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Vietnam;11 in 
2011, they demonstrated nonviolently at Israel’s borders, inspired by the peaceful Arab 
uprisings of  that year.12 This dimension is also shaped by the type of  authority against 
which claims are being made,13 and the ensuing process of  ‘tactical interaction’ between 
6  As is made clear in the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person outside his country of  their 
nationality who is unable or unwilling to receive protection from that country. UN General Assembly, 
‘Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees’, United Nations Treaty Series 189 (28 July 1951), p. 137. 
Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html.
7  ‘Statistical Yearbook 2014’, UNHCR (8 December 2015), p. 31. 
8  A descriptive typology is distinct from an explanatory one. The former proposes dimensions and 
cell types that identify and describe the overarching concept, while the latter explains the cell types as 
outcomes determined by explanatory variables in the rows and columns. David Collier, Jody LaPorte 
and Jason Seawright, ‘Puttying Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic 
Rigor’, Political Research Quarterly 65/1 (2012), pp. 217–32.
9  Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 20.
10  Charles Tilly, The Politics of  Collective Violence (New York: Columbia University, 2003). 
11  Yezid Sayyigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 195–202.
12  Diana Allan, Refugees of  the Revolution: Experiences of  Palestinian Exile (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013), p. 203. 
13  Tilly considers two dimensions of  a regime, its capacity and its level of  democracy. Tilly, The Politics 
of  Collective Violence. 
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it and contenders.14 Accordingly, refugees may draw on violent forms of  contention if 
engaging in battle with armed groups from the sending state, but nonviolent forms to 
achieve non-military ends. 
The second dimension of  variation in refugee political behaviour is the degree of  organi-
sation among refugees. Collective action is notoriously difficult.15 In the case that a group 
enjoys only moderate collective capacity, we cannot assume the sustainability of  mass 
contention.16 Moreover, the degree of  organisation implicates the nature of  the conten-
tion: cohesive movements may be more capable of  employing nonviolent protest than 
fragmented ones.17 Taken together, the two dimensions map out the types of  contention, 
as follows: 
• Transnational warfare: Armed groups engage in conflict from bases in a neigh-
bouring country using external resources (funds and fighters).18 The use of  violence 
reflects the civil wars and inter-state or proxy conflicts of  which they are a part. Or-
ganisational requirements are high (and often bolstered by rival states), and thus war-
fare has frequently been conducted by established political organisations, such as the 
defeated Rwandan government in Zaire and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) in Lebanon. 
• Social movements: Mass and sustained collective action, especially demonstrations 
and protests. Nonviolence is used to make civil demands, as opposed to a means to 
engage in warfare. This behaviour depends on a high degree of  participation and there-
fore of  organisation.19 Examples include the months of  protests and boycotts by Liberi-
an refugees in Ghana who sought migration options before the closure of  their camp.20
• Militarisation: The involvement of  refugees in non-civilian activities, including 
military training and support for combatants.21 Militarisation may precede or follow 
14  Doug McAdam, ‘Tactical Innovation and the Pace of  Insurgency’, American Sociological Review 48/6 
(1983), pp. 735–54.
15  Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of  Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of  Groups (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1965).
16  Mark I. Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 1995). Tarrow, 
Power in Movement.
17  Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).
18  Idean Salehyan, Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 15.
19  As Chenoweth and Stephan argue, participation is important to nonviolent movements because it 
provides contenders with certain sources of  leverage over their adversaries. However, their assumption 
of  an equivalence for the role of  participation in nonviolent and violent movements is flawed. Erica 
Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of  Nonviolent Conflict (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
20  Elizabeth Holzer, ‘A Case Study of  Political Failure in a Refugee Camp’, Journal of  Refugee Studies 25/ 
2 (2012), pp. 257–81.
21  Sarah Kenyon Lischer, ‘Refugee Involvement in Political Violence: Quantitative Evidence from 
1987–1998, UNHCR (31 July 2000), p.3. Muggah and Mogire provide a similar definition of  refugee 
militarisation; their definition includes militarisation among exiles (diaspora), which I exclude because 
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transnational warfare in a given case, but it refers more specifically to arming and 
associated activities that can occur with smaller-scale coordination,22 for instance in 
the case of  Liberian fighters in Guinea after the end of  the Liberian war,23 or the 
Syrian rebels who coordinate and draw upon resources in Turkey but do not use it as 
a battleground. 
• Activism: Activism is ‘action on behalf  of  a cause, action that goes beyond what 
is conventional or routine’.24 Activism among refugees may include participation in 
service provision, humanitarian aid and civil society engagement. Like social move-
ments, this behaviour is tactically nonviolent. It may be carried out in small groups, 
requiring only a moderate degree of  organisation. The example of  Syrian activists 
follows below.
• Everyday resistance: Small-scale acts that thwart the authorities’ claims or ad-
vance those of  contenders.25 Some coordination is entailed; even if  the act is carried 
out individually, there is at least ‘tacit cooperation’ such as the silence of  others.26 The 
distinction between violence and non-violence is blurry: the form of  contention mir-
rors the ‘forms of  appropriation’.27 For example, an attack on a UNHCR building to 
steal foodstuffs might entail damage to property.
This conceptualisation of  types of  refugee politics provides perspective on the case of 
activism among Syrian refugees. I collected the data that I use to describe this activism 
through semi-structured interviews conducted with Syrians in Jordan during two stints of 
fieldwork in the summers of  2014 and 2015.28 Though in refuge across the border from 
the civil war, these Syrians consider themselves to be ‘fighters’ for a cause – the Syrian 
revolution. That is, their behaviour is political contention and it is enacted as activism. 
One dimension of  this activism is its form: nonviolent. These Syrians adopt tactically 
nonviolent methods for achieving civil goals. Their nonviolence also reflects host state 
politics; the Jordanian government would presumably foreclose militarisation. The second 
dimension of  their activism is its reliance on only a moderate degree of  organisation. 
Though drawing extensively on social networks, their work can entail a small number 
of  individuals, such as a couple of  friends fundraising to house the refugee families of 
of  a diaspora’s greater access to formal political channels. See: Muggah and Mogire, ‘Arms Availability 
and Refugee Militarization in Africa’, p. 7. 
22  Ibid.
23  James Milner and Astrid Christoffersen, ‘The Militarization and Demilitarization of  Refugee Camps 
and Settlements in Guinea, 1999–2004’, in Michael Brzoska and Robert Muggah (eds), No Refuge: The 
Crisis of  Refugee Militarization in Africa (London and New York: Zed Books, 2006).
24  Brian Martin, ‘Activism, Social and Political’, in Gary L. Anderson and Kathryn G. Herr (eds), Ency-
clopedia of  Activism and Social Justice (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2007).
25  James C. Scott, ‘Hidden Forms of  Resistance’, in Forrest Colburn (ed), Everyday Forms of  Peasant Resis-
tance (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990).
26  Ibid., p. 36.
27  Ibid., p. 37.
28  Descriptive inference is ‘the process of  understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of  a 
set of  observations’. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 55.
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rebels, or a larger operation that may even be funded by development organisations but 
ultimately carried out by a few dozen Syrians. 
The scope of  activities in which activists are engaged is wide, and includes humanitar-
ian, developmental and political work that impacts both refugees’ wellbeing and civil war 
trajectories like rebel governance. Examples of  humanitarian work include finding and 
funding housing in northern Jordan for the families of  ‘martyrs’ – rebels killed in battle – 
and building a database of  Syrian patients in a local clinic to connect them to donors in 
the Gulf. Syrians are also engaged in delivering aid that reaches inside Syria, mostly to 
Daraʿa, the southern province where many of  them lived prior to the conflict; for instance, 
a four-man operation smuggled medical supplies across the borders in the first two years 
of  the conflict, and eventually developed into a formally registered organisation delivering 
large quantities of  flour and other goods. Activists have also participated in large public 
service projects inside Syria, like overseeing the provision of  garbage collection and street 
cleaning; such endeavours are are often led and sponsored by Western NGOs. Activists 
are also civically engaged, for instance, creating grassroots media outlets in Jordan that 
report on events inside Syria. Finally, activists have done formal political work that has 
included instituting opposition governance structures like local and provincial governance 
councils, often in coordination with formal opposition groups. 
The trajectory of  activists has varied over time, beginning with a spurt of  activity in 
the first years of  the conflict, followed by signs of  contraction. Many activists took part 
in the unarmed uprising in Syria in 2011. Regime persecution or general violence led 
to their flight to Jordan and a recalibration of  their work. In refuge, for example, some 
former protest organisers engaged in emergency relief  efforts for refugees while others 
took advantage of  the – at the time – relatively open borders to coordinate the delivery of 
aid to towns inside Syria. Then, as territory came under rebel control, new roles opened 
up to activists inside Syria; many returned, but they often left their families under the care 
of  the humanitarian regime in Jordan and themselves took occasional reprieves in refuge. 
At the same time, local and provincial governance councils established by Syrian activ-
ists in Jordan came to be considered illegitimate by those inside who demanded internal 
representation. Meanwhile, the Jordanian government sought to contain the proliferation 
of  the countless actors involved in the regional response by sanctioning select activity. For 
instance, activists reported that approval by Jordanian security services allowed them to 
continue to pass through increasingly restricted borders. And while the government has 
prohibited Syrians from formally registering organisations, it has also opened a path to 
registration through Jordanian partners. 
Some activists are fiercely protective of  their independence from Western NGOs, Syrian 
political groups and other external actors, but many others are deeply intertwined with 
them, and all are impacted by the political opportunity structure in the host state. The 
foremost takeaway for policymakers and NGOs involved in current crises is that activists 
can be partners in relief, development and advocacy both now and after the conflict ends. 
Activists are able to harness local networks and knowledge of  both the refugee commu-
nity and of  communities in the conflict state, and are thus well-positioned to advise on, 
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facilitate, and implement a large range of  projects. In the case that activists choose to 
engage with formal organisations, host states can ease access to employment so that activ-
ists may be fairly compensated for their efforts. NGOs can equip refugees with skills and 
training that are transferrable into additional social and economic capital, especially for 
a post-conflict scenario.
Another key resource for activists is their passion for the cause. The absolute neutrality of 
NGOs may be an unattainable objective. Yet NGOs’ self-awareness regarding the politics 
of  their refugee interlocutors is critical to achieving fairness and efficiency in projects, 
and to recognising how the political environment is being affected by, or affecting, organ-
isational objectives. Often due to fear or opportunism, host states are generally aware of 
the political potential of  refugees; they would be well advised not to foreclose opportuni-
ties (e.g. through restrictions on movement) for nonviolent engagement in consideration 
of  other, potentially problematic, outcomes. Ultimately, as long as refugees are excluded 
from formal politics, their political contention will be enacted through informal channels. 
Therefore, it is durable solutions such as resettlement that will provide the displaced with 
legal protection and the rights to engage as members of  a political community. 
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The displacement of  Syrians is now in its sixth year, and this long-term frame increasingly 
poses the question of  whether refugees are in the position to provide for themselves auton-
omously, without depending on aid. Comparing different refugee populations in the same 
host country can cast light on the factors impacting refugees’ capacity to be more or less 
reliant on humanitarian providers, and help consider possible medium and longer-term 
trends in self-reliance and durable solutions. I propose looking at Jordan and comparing 
first, the expectations of  Syrian and Iraqi asylum seekers and refugees – or persons of 
concern to UNHCR – with educational capital have towards UNHCR’s role in assisting 
them and helping find durable solutions, and second if  refugees are able to use their edu-
cational qualifications to become self-reliant. 
There are similarities and differences in the opportunity contexts of  various refugee popu-
lations in Jordan, due in particular to the fact that their stay is governed by both a refugee 
and migration regimes, the former formalised through a Memorandum of  Understand-
ing (MoU) between UNHCR and the Government of  Jordan (GoJ), the latter including 
residency and labour laws together with bilateral agreements between Jordan and the 
countries of  origin of  the migrants. 
As a result of  a number of  combined factors, Syrians need to register with UNHCR and 
the Jordanian Ministry of  Interior only if  they want to access assistance and services avail-
able to asylum seekers. Even if  they choose not to register, they do not need a residence 
permit to stay long-term in Jordan. As for Iraqis, their registration with UNHCR serves 
mostly as a conduit for resettlement or family reunification. Under the migration regime, 
a residence permit is compulsory for Iraqis, and can be acquired through financial capital 
or work contracts. Between 30 and 40 percent of  those Iraqis registered with UNHCR 
also have residence permits. 
The MoU between UNHCR and the GoJ does not envision local integration as a possi-
ble durable solution and does not mention refugees’ right to work. This does not mean 
that refugees do not work. The Jordanian law governing the labour of  foreigners applies 
to Iraqis and Syrians regardless of  their status with UNHCR. A number of  professions, 
mostly non-qualified, are open to foreigners requiring an application for a work permit 
on the basis of  a work contract. Syrian refugees have quickly looked for work opportuni-
ties, and about half  of  the households have at least one member engaged in some form 
of  labour. In about two-thirds of  the cases, however, this takes place through informal 
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arrangements, without a contract or permit.1 The fact that Syrians work in the informal 
economy might not be a vulnerability factor in itself, considering that 44 percent of  Jorda-
nians also work informally.2 However, for Syrians, it carries serious risks: if  they are caught 
without a work permit, they can be subjected to imprisonment and refoulement, or can be 
moved to refugee camps. 
The proportion of  refugees with educational qualifications is not marginal. 41 percent 
of  Syrians registered with UNHCR have at least a secondary education, whereas 13 
percent have a university degree.3 Anecdotal evidences show that the proportion of  uni-
versity graduates is higher among unregistered Syrians. As for Iraqis in Jordan, 50 percent 
of  them had a university education in 2007, when the number of  those registered with 
UNHCR was about as high as today.4 Jordanian labour requirements exclude from the 
work market most qualified non-Jordanian professionals. There are reasons for this exclu-
sion: a large part of  Jordanian graduates already cannot integrate in the work market and 
emigrate, mostly to Gulf  countries, to access labour opportunities. This situation makes 
it very challenging for those Iraqis and Syrians who hold degrees to find jobs matching 
their qualifications. 
In work on Iraqis in Jordan conducted before the arrival of  Syrian refugees, I had noted 
that the majority of  the former, highly educated but without enough financial capital to 
stabilise their stay in Jordan, were looking for avenues for secondary migration through 
refugee resettlement schemes, family reunion, legal migration channels or irregular 
migration, even when many would have preferred to stay in Jordan. This trend was com-
pounded by the pull of  family and other social ties from within distant diasporas that 
started reaching a critical mass during the 1990s. 
In late 2014, I interviewed a sample of  75 working-age, out of  camp Syrians and Iraqis 
registered with UNHCR, and who had a minimum level of  education corresponding to 
a high school diploma. I wanted to check if  my previous findings remained valid for old 
and recent arrivals from Iraq, and to compare the situation of  Iraqis with that of  Syrians. 
Furthermore, I combined these aspects with an inquiry into respondents’ reliance on the 
assistance provided by UNHCR and its partners, and how much they expected UNHCR 
to help them find durable solutions. The Iraqis provide a useful disparity to the situation of 
Syrians, and a longer-term perspective since they have been hosted in Jordan as refugees 
since 1996. 
I found that, among Syrians, a medium level of  education (high school level up to Bache-
lor’s) was correlated with the lowest level of  engagement in economic activities. Some felt 
they did not have the skills to access available jobs, which were mostly manual, whereas 
1  ‘Lives Unseen: Urban Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Host Communities Three Years into the Syria 
Crisis’, CARE International (2014).
2  ‘The Informal Sector in the Jordanian Economy’, Jordanian Ministry of  Planning in International Coopera-
tion, Economic and Social Council, UNDP, AECID (2013).
3  ‘Lives Unseen’.
4  ‘Iraqis in Jordan: Their Number and Characteristics’, FAFO (2007). Available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/47626a232.pdf.
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others preferred to live off  their financial assets rather than work below their skills. Most 
of  those with a university degree were able to find work, formally or informally, however 
receiving salaries below those of  Jordanians in equivalent positions, and with contracts 
and permits to be renegotiated every year. Among Iraqis, it was those most recently 
arrived who were less likely to be engaged in economic activities, regardless of  their edu-
cational level. 
Ninety percent of  the Syrians interviewed mentioned some form of  material assistance 
(cash, food and non-food items) received from humanitarian organisations. However, all 
those with at least a Bachelor’s Degree had recently been informed by the World Food 
Programme (WFP) that they would no longer receive food assistance.15 percent of  the 
Iraqis received cash assistance, all but one of  them recent arrivals. 
Expectations towards UNHCR were sharply contrasting. All Iraqis saw UNHCR’s role 
as primarily facilitating third-country resettlement and/or family reunification, and 
only recent arrivals and those stranded long-term in Jordan without a residence permit 
expected other forms of  assistance. Several respondents articulated their reasons to prefer 
resettlement over local integration as wanting to carry on with their lives, whereas Jordan 
offers them no long-term social and economic prospects. All respondents, even those with 
a job and/or a residency, regularly renewed their asylum seeker certificates with UNHCR 
to keep their resettlement options open. 
Forty seven percent of  Syrians stated that they expected to return to Syria, 30 percent 
wanted to settle long-term in Jordan, and 23 percent mentioned secondary migration. 
None wanted to live in a camp. They saw UNHCR as the main provider of  humanitarian 
assistance, but none mentioned that they expected UNHCR to help them reach a dura-
ble solution. Only two saw a link between their registration with UNHCR and possible 
protection against deportation to Syria or a camp, which were the main concerns of  all 
respondents. Finally, even amongst those who wanted to emigrate further, resettlement 
was not a well understood concept. 
I reinterviewed 53 of  the initial respondents one year later, at a time when a number of  fac-
tors had impacted Syrian refugees’ opportunity context in Jordan and beyond: UNHCR 
and the Jordanian Ministry of  Interior were performing re-registration of  Syrian refugees; 
WFP had frozen food vouchers distribution to Syrian refugees throughout the Middle 
East; Jordanian security forces had intensified their measures against illegal labour and 
refugees without bailout from camps (resulting in more cases of  refoulement and deporta-
tions to camps); the mass migration movement of  Syrians to Europe had started; and 
more countries were taking Syrians for resettlement through UNHCR referrals. 
Of  32 respondents with a medium level of  education, five were now living in camps 
where one had been deported and four moved voluntarily to gain access to assistance. 
Two had left to Europe. Two more had recently found labour in the service sector and 
were trying to obtain work contracts. The others were continuing to deplete their savings 
or to borrow money. Their view of  UNHCR’s role had evolved: half  of  them were aware 
of  resettlement options, and three quarters now doubted the agency’s capacity to provide 
humanitarian assistance beyond the next two years. 
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Of  nine Syrian respondents with the highest university degrees, seven had voluntarily not 
re-registered with UNHCR and the Ministry of  Interior as they considered that this brought 
them no specific benefit. Four, albeit having jobs, said they were considering secondary 
migration since they saw their professional and social prospects in Jordan as very limited. 
In March 2016, the GoJ announced that it would grant 200,000 work permits to Syrians, 
in the framework of  a new approach worked out with the humanitarian and development 
communities, and supported by international donors and investors. This move, hailed 
as a progressive step towards refugee self-reliance, regulates the access of  Syrians to the 
work market on the basis of  the existing labour law, and, when implemented, will legalise 
the situation of  many who are already working.5 More generally, it is likely that more and 
more Syrians in Jordan currently dependent on humanitarian assistance will be able to 
become self-reliant by accessing the domestic labour market either by meeting existing 
needs, or through family and patronage ties in the host country. 
On the other hand, Jordan’s protectionist labour policies hinder access to jobs for the 
most educated Syrians. The fact that some are shunning the humanitarian assistance 
framework does not necessarily mean that they have reached a level of  self-reliance which 
they find satisfactory. In fact, this group, like their Iraqi peers, are amongst the most likely 
to seek secondary migration. Existing data shows that educated Syrians are already a 
large proportion of  those having made their way into Western Europe. In Germany, for 
example, at least 20 percent have a Bachelor’s Degree,6 and the pull of  social and family 
networks is increasing on those still in the Middle East. 
Host countries such as Jordan cannot be expected to absorb refugee graduates when their 
own educated nationals emigrate in large numbers to find labour. The question posed is 
therefore that of  how to address the issue of  long-term solutions for this segment of  the 
refugee population, and if  answers can be found within the international refugee regime, 
or should rather emerge from a different approach. 
Resettlement and family reunification through the international refugee regime have long 
been used by highly educated Iraqis as a conduit for labour migration. However, they 
hardly provide an adequate framework to respond to the expectations of  refugees able to 
work and eager to reconstruct their lives with minimum reliance on humanitarian provid-
ers: considering the small number of  resettlement places, priority is given to refugees with 
specific vulnerabilities; resettlement delays can be extremely long for non-priority cases; 
and the costs and administrative burden of  resettlement bear upon international and 
national refugee institutions, with some involvement from the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM). In this context, it might be worthwhile looking into more systematic 
partnerships between actors within the international refugee regime, institutions such as 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), and national governments that operate 
skilled migration schemes in Western countries and in the Gulf. 
5  ‘The Impact of  the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Labour Market in Jordan: A Preliminary Analysis’, 
ILO, Regional Office for Arab States (2014); ‘Work Permits for Syrian Refugees in Jordan’, ILO, Regional Office 
for Arab States (2015).
6  ‘Is this Humanitarian Migration Crisis Different?’, OECD Migration Policy Debates 7 (September 2015). 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf.
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Background 
Governance has often been viewed by practitioners and policymakers through the lens 
of  a developed state model, magnifying the importance of  strong structures in the form 
of  state, civil society and formal institutions.1 The Western and Weberian conceptions 
of  state-centred governance, which view the state as a set of  formal arrangements that 
institutionalise power, is often challenged in explaining how state (and society) operates 
in the developing world.2 The shortcoming is largely in failing to recognise informal insti-
tutions and their various governance-related functions – such as service delivery, dispute 
resolution, representation and electoral politics. An alternative approach to thinking 
about governance acknowledges the role of  informal institutions and shifts attention from 
government-centric processes towards poly-centric processes, encompassing numerous 
actors, groups and networks, which could be formal or informal.3
Formal and informal institutions can be differentiated according to how they were devel-
oped, codified, communicated and enforced.4 Informal Institutions are defined by ‘socially 
1  ‘An Upside Down View of  Governance’, Institute of  Development Studies (Brighton: University of  Sussex, 
2010). Available at: http://www2.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/pdfs/AnUpside-downViewofGovernance.pdf.
2  Jeremy Allouche, ‘The Role of  Informal Service Providers in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
State-Building’, in Erica Weinthal, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama (eds), Water and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2014).
3  Nora Stel, ‘Governance Between Isolation and Integration: A Study on the Interaction between Leb-
anese State Institutions and Palestinian Authorities in Shabriha Gathering, South Lebanon’, Issam Fares 
Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs Working Paper Series 22 (Beirut, 2014). Available at: https://
www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/publications/documents/working_papers/20140620_ifi_refugees_nora_stel.
pdf. Claudia Pahl-Wostl, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Adaptive Capacity and Multi-Level 
Learning Processes in Resource Governance Regimes’, Global Environmental Change 19/3 (2009), pp. 354–
365. Available at: http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.06.001. Kasper Hoffman and Tom Kirk, 
‘Public Authority and the Provision of  Public Goods in Conflict-Affected and Transitioning Regions’, 
Justice and Security Research Programme Paper 7 (2013). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56353/.
4  Pahl-Wostl, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Adaptive Capacity’. Gretchen Helmke and 
27 The Informal Adaptive Mechanisms among Syrian Refugees and Marginalised Host Communities in Lebanon
shared rules’ and ‘the unwritten rules of  political life’ that are created, communicated 
and enforced outside of  official channels, and usually outside of  the public eye.5 Formal 
institutions are distinguished from informal institutions for they stem from official and reg-
ulated public or private systems recognised by the state (such as the constitution). Formal 
institutions are ‘behaviourally prescriptive and normative’, meaning they dictate how 
actors should or should not act. Thus, formal institutions are enforced through official 
bodies and mechanisms, such as the police. Informal institutions, on the other hand, are 
‘self-enforced’ and ‘socially-sanctioned’, arising from social norms, traditions, attitudes 
and morals, or in other words, they are widely accepted unwritten rules.6 Both formal and 
informal institutions provide predictability and stability to human interactions and thus 
help to reduce uncertainty.7 Formal and informal institutions are not mutually exclusive 
and often exist alongside each other within institutional setups.8 Therefore, it makes sense 
to not just focus on one type, but to consider the relation between both.
Informal institutions fulfill three functions: they complete or fill gaps left by formal 
institutions; they operate in parallel to formal institutions to regulate the same kind of 
political behaviour; and they help coordinate the operation of  intersecting/overlapping 
institutions.9 In all three instances, informal and formal institutions exist largely in comple-
mentary fashion with each other. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky approached the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions by taking into account two dimen-
sions: the effectiveness of  formal institutions and the degree to which the outcomes of 
formal and informal institutions converge (whether they lead to similar outcomes or not).10
A Typology of Informal Institutions
Complementary informal institutions coexist with effective formal institutions in such a 
way that they neither violate formal rules nor produce divergent outcomes. Accommo-
dating informal institutions operate in ways that alter the effects of  formal institutions 
Steven Levitsky (eds), Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2006).
5  Julia R. Azari and Jennifer K. Smith, ‘Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established 
Democracies’, Perspectives on Politics 10/01 (2012), pp. 37–55. Available at: http://doi.org/10.1017/
S1537592711004890. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, ‘Informal Institutions and Comparative 
Politics’, Perspectives on Politics 2/4 (2004), pp. 725–740.
6  Indra De Soysa and Johannes Jütting, ‘Informal Institutions and Development, Think Local, Act 
Global’, presented at the International Seminar on Informal Institutions and Development – What do 
we know and what can we do?, OECD Development Centre and Development Assistance Committee (2006). Avail-
able at: http://instruct.uwo.ca/economics/317b-570/Institutions_worldbank.pdf. 
7  Kellee S. Tsai, ‘Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China’, World 
Politics 59/01 (2006), pp. 116–141. Available at: http://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0018. Patrick Köllner, 
‘Informal Institutions in Autocracies: Analytical Perspectives and the Case of  the Chinese Communist 
Party’, GIGA Working Papers 232 (2013). Available at: http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/81134.
8  Köllner, ‘Informal Institutions in Autocracies’.
9  Azari and Smith, ‘Unwritten Rules’. 
10  Helmke and Levitsky, ‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics’.
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without violating their rules. Competing informal institutions enable actors to ignore and 
violate ineffective formal institutions and produce divergent outcomes. Substitutive insti-
tutions replace failed and ineffective formal institutions and seek to produce outcomes 
compatible with formal rules and procedures. Similar to complementary institutions, sub-
stitutive informal institutions are employed by actors who seek outcomes compatible with 
formal institutions (Table 1).11
Table 1. A Typology of Informal Institutions
Source: (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).
Outcomes Effective Formal Institutions Ineffective Formal Institutions
Convergent Complementary Substitutive
Divergent Accommodating Competing
A variant of  substitutive informal institutions are ‘informal adaptive institutions’, which 
are defined as ‘regularised patterns of  interaction’ characterised by informal coping 
strategies and novel operating arrangements devised by actors to replace extant formal 
institutions that are no longer effective.12 Tsai’s definition builds on the typology provided 
by Gretchen and Levitsky to theorise the processes by which informal institutions emerge, 
change and eventually formalise.13 Tsai suggests that when interests converge between 
the enforcers of  formal institutions and creators of  informal strategies, adaptive informal 
institutions emerge and thrive.
Instead of  focusing on rule-based institutions, there is need to shift the attention towards 
informal institutions and the ways in which formal institutions can be adjusted or evaded 
through the conception of  creative responses or what is coined as ‘informal adaptive 
institutions’.14 Contrary to the teachings of  Max Weber, informal institutions do not lead 
to bad governance but can actually help pave the way for rule-based governance and 
formal institutions.15 As such, the shift towards ‘rule-based’ and ‘relationship-based’ insti-
tutions necessitates an analytical shift from formal institutions to informal institutions, 
taking into account the interplay and interactions between both.16 Therefore, instead of 
vilifying informal institutions and prioritising formal ones, informal institutions should be 
portrayed as ‘vehicles for change’ and conducive to influential outcomes.17
11  Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Democracy.
12 Tsai, ‘Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China’. Köllner, ‘Infor-
mal Institutions in Autocracies’.
13  Tsai, ‘Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China’.
14  Ibid., Köllner, ‘Informal Institutions in Autocracies’.
15  ‘An Upside Down View of  Governance’, Institute of  Development Studies. ‘Societies, States and Citizens: 
A Policymaker’s Guide to the Research’, Centre of  the Future State (Brighton, 2010). Available at: http://
www2.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/pdfs/Future%20State%20DRC%20Policy%20Briefing%20SSC10.pdf. 
16  ‘An Upside Down View of  Governance’, Institute of  Development Studies.
17  Ibid., Tsai, ‘Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China’. 
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It is often that marginalised communities such as refugees and their host communities 
create informal mechanisms to adapt to the difficulties in gaining access to services pro-
vided through formal mechanisms, either because they are costly, ineffective or absent.18 
Failures in governance, in the form of  ineffective and inefficient structures, leave these 
groups unable to satisfy their basic needs. Coupled with a lack of  an institutional setting to 
voice demands, government exclusion and dire socio-economic settings force the marginal-
ised groups and ‘disenfranchised’ groups to act as a collective force utilising alternative and 
informal modes or ‘uninstitutionalised and hybrid social activities’ in an effort to improve 
their living conditions.19 They carry on their daily lives, exerting acts of  ‘silent encroach-
ment’, ‘self-enactment’ and ‘self-assertion’, relying on self-help and resilience mechanisms.20
The coping mechanisms devised by marginalised groups emerge in terms of  focal points 
and become entrenched in society as a result of  repeated and diffused interactions or 
bargaining.21
Informal Mechanisms among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their host communities often find themselves in a consid-
erably vulnerable position in regards to accessing services, a situation compounded by the 
shortfall in the ability of  the Lebanese government to provide these services – specifically 
to refugees and the poor  – and the clientelistic nature of  service delivery in Lebanon.22 
The majority of  refugees reside in informal urban and peri-urban areas. 82 percent are 
informally renting, by and large, sub-standard houses and previously derelict places such 
as depots and garages. International organisations and other charities provide rental sup-
port, thus creating an informal rental market estimated at around $1 billion.
There are indeed striking levels of  resilience among the Syrian refugees – and Palestinian 
refugees – as well as among their host communities in Lebanon. This is largely based on 
their reliance on a myriad of  mechanisms, including formal and informal options pro-
vided by various actors to ensure ‘decent’ access to public and social services.23 
18  Asef  Bayat, ‘Un-Civil Society: The Politics of  the “Informal People”’, Third World Quarterly 18/1 
(1997), pp. 53–72. Available at: http://doi.org/10.1080/01436599715055. Nasser Yassin, Rima Rassi 
and Nora Stel, ‘Organized Chaos: Informal Institution Building among Palestinian Refugees in the 
Maashouk Gathering in South Lebanon’, Journal of  Refugee Studies (2016, in press).
19  Bayat, ‘Un-Civil Society’.
20  Ibid., Hans-Joachim Lauth, ‘Informal Institutions and Democracy’, Democratization 7/4 (2000), pp. 
21–50. Available at: http://doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403683.
21  Tsai, ‘Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China’. Helmke and 
Levitsky, ‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics’.
22  Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar, ‘Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics 
of  Welfare Allocation in Lebanon’, World Politics 62/03 (2010), pp. 381–421. Available at: http://doi.
org/10.1017/S0043887110000080.
23 ‘Investigating Grey Areas: Access to Basic Urban Services in the Adjacent Areas of  Palestinian Ref-
ugee Camps in Lebanon’, UNDP and UN-HABITAT (2010). Available at: http://www.undp.org.lb/
communication/publications/downloads/fullstudy-InverstigatingGreyAreas.pdf. ‘Profiling Depri-
vation: An Analysis of  the Rapid Needs Assessment in Palestinian Gatherings Host Communities in 
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Those are the mechanisms that do not stem from official public or private regulatory sys-
tems recognised by the government.
Looking deeper into the processes of  seeking such public and social services, it is evident 
that refugees rely on multiple mechanisms involving formal, semi-formal and informal 
methods. Indeed, any one resident may tap into several different routes in order to access 
just one single service. Some of  the informal structures that facilitate access to basic ser-
vices include building connections with local figures (or ‘wasta’ as known in the Middle 
East), illegally digging a communal well, receiving healthcare from a local community 
organisation, or getting financial assistance from apolitical groups. In some instances, 
seeking family support and borrowing from family members is the only way. Coping strat-
egies used by refugees are essentially built on a range of  adaptive informal institutions that 
are outside the regulatory frameworks of  government.
What Can Be Done?
The current situation necessitates a shift in the architecture of  the response to the ref-
ugee crisis. At the core of  it is altering the focus from formal to informal institutions. 
This means putting emphasis on the ‘function’ not ‘the form’ of  institutions and moving 
from ‘rules-based’ to ‘relationship-based’ drivers for behaviour. As Helmke and Levitsky 
indicate, it is paramount to recognise and even celebrate informal institutions, whether 
those complementary to the rigid formal institutions or the substitutive ones that aim at 
achieving the same goals as weak formal institutions. Informal institutions and mecha-
nisms should not be at odds with formal ones but rather cajoled to complement the latter’s 
apathy or inadaptability. Embracing institutions as inherently relational ultimately means 
that analysts and policymakers have to recognise that it is ‘the accumulation of  informal 
interactions between local state and non-state actors’ that can provide ‘both the impetus 
and legitimising basis’ for eventual reform or formalisation.24
Lebanon’, UNDP and UN-HABITAT (2014). Available at: http://unhabitat.org/?wpdmact.process&-
did.MTI2Mi5ob3RsaW5r.
24  Tsai, ‘Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China’, p. 118.
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Introduction
Compared to the vast literature on migrant and refugee integration in Europe and North 
America, we know relatively little about how host countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa region (MENA) – and developing countries more broadly – choose to treat ref-
ugees: whether to offer access to residency, employment and services, or to treat them 
with exclusion. Three assumptions embedded within the extant literature on migration to 
developing countries account for this lack of  knowledge.
First, the literature assumes an impermanence of  refugees residing in developing host 
states. Refugees in transit are thought to only be aiming for Western democracies – 
Europe, North America, or Australia – and any country crossed while en route is assumed 
to be a place of  temporary residence. This viewpoint provides an incomplete picture that 
misses many of  the nuances underpinning the realities of  contemporary migration to and 
through developing countries. 
Second, the literature assumes that refugees are warehoused against their will in camps 
managed by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), thus allowing for little inter-
action with the host population or government. In actuality, the majority of  refugees no 
longer live in camps: more than half  of  the world’s refugees, and all migrants for that 
matter, live in urban areas.1 In the Middle East specifically, the vast majority of  refugees 
reside outside of  camps in either urban or rural areas where they are likely to have a great 
deal of  interaction with host country nationals and host state authorities.
The final misconception is a mischaracterisation of  host states themselves as low-capacity, 
meaning that states are not capable of  engaging with or providing services to refugees. As 
stated by Betts, ‘with relatively porous borders, limited capacity to deport, and a clearly 
defined legal obligation not to forcibly return refugees to their countries of  origin if  they 
The research for this paper was supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada, the Project on Middle East Political Science, and the Kugelman Center for Citizen Peacebuild-
ing. I would like to thank Lama Mourad for her suggestions on an earlier version of  this paper.
1  Patricia Ward, ‘Refugee Cities: Reflections on the Development and Impact of  UNHCR Urban Ref-
ugee Policy in the Middle East’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 33/1 (2014), pp. 77–93.
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face persecution, these neighbouring states have little choice but to host refugees.’2 In 
other words, developing states do not have the capacity to prevent migration, and thus 
must accept their role as temporary host countries. In a similar vein, Hollifield states that 
‘in Africa and the Middle East, which have high numbers of  migrants and refugees, there 
is a great deal of  instability, and states are fluid with little institutional or legal capacity for 
dealing with international migration.’3
State capacity does not, in and of  itself, determine host state responses to refugees; rather, 
states make strategic calculations based on incentives involved about when and how to 
engage refugee populations. Through an examination of  the refugee-hosting situations in 
Turkey, Egypt and Morocco, I propose a reconceptualisation of  host state responsibility 
and its relationship with host state capacity.
Turkey
Since the beginning of  the Syrian crisis, Turkey has attempted to manage the refugee 
influx on its own terms, though the government had no way of  anticipating that the 
number of  Syrian refugees would rise to nearly three million in five years. Unable to 
receive full refugee status because of  Turkey’s geographical reservation to the 1951 Ref-
ugee Convention, Syrians are entitled to temporary protection in Turkey. While refugees 
of  other nationalities must register with local authorities to receive residency and with 
UNHCR to be considered eligible for resettlement, Syrians are only permitted to register 
with Turkish authorities for all aspects of  protection.
The desire to control the Syrian crisis is also reflected in Turkey’s initial reluctance to 
accept international aid in dealing with the refugee influx. An individual at a UN agency 
in Ankara explained: ‘The government, at the beginning of  the crisis, was clear that they 
would provide all the services. So there wasn’t much space for international agencies.’4 
This has changed in the last two years as more international organisations have been 
permitted to operate inside Turkey. However, a representative of  the International Orga-
nization for Migration (IOM) explained that, nonetheless, ‘Turkey is providing all the 
assistance and they are in the driver’s seat, so our role as IOM and UN is much more 
to support the work of  the government.’5 Turkey’s leading role is also reflected through 
financial allocations; the Turkish state has spent between $9 and 10 billion as of  May 
2016, primarily directed towards the government-run refugee camps established in the 
country’s southeast.
While Turkey experienced refugee influxes throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, it was 
not until 2013 that the country adopted comprehensive domestic legislation with Law no. 
6458 on Foreigners and International Protection. Importantly, the new law transferred 
2  Alexander Betts, Global Migration Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 13.
3  James F. Hollifield, ‘The Emerging Migration State’, International Migration Review 38/3 (September 
2004), p. 905.
4  Author interview with the Emergency Coordinator, UNICEF, Ankara, Turkey (29 May 2015). 
5  Author interview with the Program Coordinator, UNHCR, Istanbul, Turkey (11 May 2015).
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responsibility over migration affairs, including refugees, from the Turkish police to a 
newly-created civil body, the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM). 
Turkey has invested substantial manpower and financial resources into the new DGMM, 
which the director of  a prominent civil society organisation described as ‘ambitious’.6
Yet, Turkey’s desire to appear capable of  managing the Syrian situation through the 
DGMM and the Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (AFAD) is not necessarily 
in line with the government’s institutional abilities. While the government has biometri-
cally registered 2.7 million refugees, UN officials and NGOs indicated that the Turkish 
government had not been collecting enough information during registration, only focusing 
on basic biometrics. This is potentially detrimental in terms of  conducting vulnerability 
assessments – done by the government instead of  UNHCR – for the purpose of  targeted 
aid or selecting individuals for resettlement. In order to manage such a large population, 
the government has attempted to minimise the internal movement of  Syrians by only 
providing full access to services for those who remain in their city of  initial registration or 
in camps, even though Syrians are spread throughout the country, even in major cities like 
Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.
Despite any known limitations, projecting the image of  Turkey as a high-capacity state is 
critical in the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) relations with Europe. The govern-
ment has underlined its capability at every opportunity during the ongoing negotiations 
between the European Union (EU) and Turkey in order to demonstrate the extent to 
which the country has invested in hosting Syrians, and to emphasise that the EU needs to 
offer further aid in the name of  burden-sharing. 
Egypt 
A host to at least 267,000 refugees, including 140,000 to 240,000 Syrians, Egypt tends 
to turn a blind eye to its refugee population and generally refrains from providing state-
funded services directly to individuals. Given the many political and social challenges 
facing the country, refugees are often treated as ‘one more problem’ that the government 
would rather not have to deal with. But ambivalence in terms of  service provision does not 
mean that the Egyptian state is unaware of  certain gains derived from hosting refugees. 
First, international migration organisations like UNHCR and IOM, in addition to smaller 
migrant-focused international NGOs, bring in international funding that also translates 
into development funding for the broader Egyptian populace. These entities also directly 
provide essential services for refugees that the Egyptian government might otherwise have 
to provide itself.
The perverse incentive to keep refugees reliant upon international aid is illustrated through 
the residency permit system. When conducting interviews in 2014, refugees of  all nation-
alities described the increasing difficulties faced when trying to obtain a residency permit 
6  Author interview with the Founder and Director, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Istanbul, Turkey (15 
May 2015).
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in Egypt. One Eritrean refugee complained: ‘Before the revolution [the permit] was for 
one year or even more, but after the revolution it’s always for six months.’ In response to 
a question about whether the state would consider lengthening this time period, a gov-
ernment official explained that ‘extending it towards one year or more means that the 
government may be responsible for normalising the situation of  refugees, without being 
equipped with international help in this regard.’7 Egypt has little incentive to officially 
integrate refugees if  doing so may mean less international aid channeled into the country. 
Yet, there is an important exception to Egypt’s hands-off  approach. When Syrians began 
arriving en mass in 2012, former President Mohamed Morsi announced that all Syrian 
children residing in Egypt would be enroled in public schools regardless of  their UNHCR 
status, and that Syrian families could access Egyptian public hospitals for free; services that 
are not automatically granted to other refugee nationalities. This was particularly surpris-
ing as Syrians constituted the largest group of  refugees in Egypt at the time. If  a lack of 
capacity had been preventing Egypt from extending state services to other groups, then 
one would expect this to be an even bigger challenge with the large Syrian population.
It became clear, in hindsight, that this decision was politically motivated by former Pres-
ident Morsi’s desire to show solidarity with Syrian opposition forces. However, following 
the Egyptian military coup in July 2013, Syrians in Egypt became the subject of  a govern-
ment-organised media campaign that referred to the group as ‘terrorists’, allied with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi supporters. 
In other words, the Egyptian state was willing to demonstrate its hosting capacity by 
extending services to Syrian refugees – the largest group of  refugees in Egypt – as a result 
of  perceived political gains, though this left Syrians in a precarious situation when the 
subsequent regime turned against them. 
Morocco
Unlike other countries in the region, Morocco has received relatively few refugees from 
other MENA states over the last ten years, and the overall UNHCR figures for refugees in 
Morocco are quite low. The majority of  migrants residing in Morocco are from sub-Sa-
haran Africa, most of  whom do not qualify for official refugee status. According to a 2010 
study, 76 percent of  sub-Saharan migrants residing in Morocco at the time – approxi-
mately 30,000 individuals – were irregular.8 Nonetheless, Morocco provides an interesting 
case through which to examine host government capacity because of  its 2013 policy shift.
7  Author interview with a deidentified individual, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, Cairo, Egypt (11 Novem-
ber 2014).
8  Mohamed Khachani, ‘Le Tissu Associatif  et Le Traitement de La Question Migratoire’ [The Asso-
ciative Fabric and the Treatment of  the Question of  Migration], Federation Internationale des Societes de la 
Croix Rouge et des Croissants Rouges (2010).
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In August 2013, GADEM, a migration-focused NGO, compiled a highly critical report on 
the status of  migration in Morocco. This report provided the basis for a more condensed 
publication by the Moroccan National Human Rights Council (CNDH), and presented 
during a closed session between the council and the government. Shortly thereafter, on 9 
September, representatives from GADEM presented their report in Geneva at an inter-
national forum. The next day, King Mohammed VI announced his plans for migration 
policy reform, which would include a regularisation process for irregular migrants, and 
the government – as opposed to UNHCR – taking on responsibility for refugees. 
This timeline of  events has led GADEM and other civil society organisations to conclude 
that the primary motivation behind the King’s announcement of  reform was to avoid 
international shaming: Morocco despises humiliation on the international stage. Organi-
sations also cite Morocco’s mobility partnership with the EU that was signed in June 2013 
as another incentive behind the timing of  the reform. A third explanation suggested by 
civil society groups is Morocco’s desire to play a leading role in Africa, both economically 
and geopolitically. If  Morocco wants to take on a leadership position, then it must put on 
a welcoming face towards migrants from African countries. 
As a result of  the reform, those involved with migrant protection in Morocco differentiate 
between the pre- and post-2013 governmental approach to migration. However, even 
after 2013, the government continues to rely on civil society service provision, sometimes 
leading to an uncomfortable power dynamic. 
For example, Caritas, a Catholic international NGO (INGO) that provides health services 
to migrants and refugees, was forced to temporarily close its largest operation in Rabat 
after state authorities arrested irregular migrants near the Spanish border and deposited 
them at the Caritas office. The director explained how the decision to temporarily close 
its operation was a difficult one to take but acted as a necessary statement to Moroc-
can authorities.9 Even with official legislation in place, the distribution of  responsibilities 
between the government and civil society actors in Morocco remains tenuous.
Conclusion
Host state capacity and host state perceptions of  responsibility need to be critically 
assessed from the vantage point of  all relevant actors – refugees, NGOs, and government 
officials – to better understand the current dynamics of  the refugee crisis in the MENA 
region. While Western donor states and international migration bodies like UNHCR and 
IOM continue to push for host state responsibility, governments may have differing views 
of  the appropriate division of  labour between themselves, INGOs, and NGOs. Often 
this division of  labour is informal and occurs in the absence of  national legislation or 
formal agreements. If  national legislation is in place, like in the cases of  Turkey and 
Morocco, it may be composed of  regulations and policies that suffer from implementa-
tion failures. While it may sometimes be advantageous for host states to appear capable, 
9  Author interview with the Director, Caritas, Rabat, Morocco (19 March 2015).
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as demonstrated by Turkey’s handling of  the Syrian crisis, other states like Egypt find it 
more advantageous to rely on international aid and development funding to manage their 
refugee situation.
Whether and how states choose to take responsibility for refugees – as opposed to leaving 
the task to international actors – may also depend on the origin of  the refugees them-
selves, in as much as these groups can provide geostrategic advantages to the host country. 
Supporting Syrian refugees has been useful to both Turkey and Egypt because of  per-
ceived international gains, whereas these host states do not derive the same benefit from 
other refugee populations. The same is true for Morocco and sub-Saharan migrants, 
particularly as most of  these individuals do not fit the parameters of  the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the Moroccan state could more easily neglect them without large repu-
tational costs. However, if  Morocco wants to position itself  as a leader in West Africa in 
order to encourage trade and gain regional political clout, then supporting these popula-
tions is beneficial.
In the case of  all three host states – Egypt, Morocco and Turkey – geostrategic impera-
tives and international perceptions appear to be driving decisions more than the capacity 
of  each host state. Capacity is therefore not only an empirical reality but also a perception 
that can serve strategic purposes, and this influences the choices that host states make 
regarding refugee responsibility.
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Introduction
Most countries in the Middle East are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and do not have a comprehensive and effective legal framework for asylum, yet they are 
among the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world. Regional mechanisms for ref-
ugee protection are also lacking. However, refugee protection in these countries does not 
operate in a complete legal vacuum. In addition to international human rights treaties 
and relevant domestic legislation, bilateral Memoranda of  Understanding (MoUs) signed 
between UNHCR and host governments such as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon regulate the 
main aspects of  refugee protection.
This paper looks at the MoUs signed by UNHCR with the governments of  Jordan and 
Lebanon in 1998 and 2003 respectively. It suggests analysing the asylum policies reflected 
in the MoUs and to what extent they were implemented in practice. It also looks at 
whether the MoUs are adequate instruments to respond to the challenges of  the large-
scale displacement situations faced by the two countries since 2003. 
Overview of the MoUs
Jordan signed the MoU with UNHCR in 1998.1 UNHCR had been operating in the 
country without any legal framework since 1991 following the refugee influx resulting 
from the first Gulf  War. In 1997, a Cooperation Agreement granted UNHCR the immu-
nity and privileges necessary for the conduct of  its activities and paved the way for the 
signature of  the MoU in 1998. The MoU adopts a refugee definition similar to the one 
adopted by the 1951 Refugee Convention (Article 1) and declares Jordan’s commitment 
to international standards for refugee protection (Article 5). It explicitly recognises the 
principle of non-refoulement (Article 2) and refugees’ right to remain in the country tem-
porarily (Article 5). Jordan also committed to respect refugees’ freedom to practice their 
religious beliefs without discrimination (Article 6), their right to access courts and legal aid 
(Article 7), right to work (Articles 8 & 9) and exemption from overstay fines and departure 
fees (Article 10). Refugee advocates considered that the MoU fell short of  guaranteeing 
most of  the Convention rights and did not bring any change to existing legislation, which 
already guarantees the same rights, sometimes in a larger scope.2
1  ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between the Government of  the Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan 
and UNHCR’, The Official Gazette of  the Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan 4277, 3 May 1998.
2  Ayman Halasa, ‘The Legal Status of  Non-Palestinian Refugees in Jordan’, Mutah Lil-Buhuth wad-Dirasat 
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Lebanon signed the MoU with UNHCR in 2003.3 Prior to that date, UNHCR had been 
operating on the basis of  a gentlemen’s agreement with the Lebanese authorities and 
struggled to find ad hoc solutions for refugees in the country. However, a significant rise 
in the detention and deportation of  refugees as of  1999 forced UNHCR to enter into 
lengthy negotiations with the Lebanese authorities, which resulted in the signing of  the 
MoU. The MoU was welcomed as a first step for the protection of  refugees, most impor-
tantly because it recognised for the first time the right to remain in Lebanon for persons 
with a fear of  return to their countries of  origin. It was however criticised for failing to 
provide sufficient protection for refugees, especially that it did not mention the principle of 
non-refoulement and restricted its scope to asylum seekers who register with UNHCR within 
two months of  their illegal entry to Lebanon (Article 1).4 
The ‘State-to-UN Responsibility Shift’ as a Means to Prevent 
Local Integration
The MoUs are viewed as alternative protection regimes that provide a legal framework to 
regulate the status of  refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. Their scope was however limited 
to finding temporary humanitarian solutions for non-Palestinian refugees without offering 
a durable solution. 
The MoUs establish that both states are ‘transit countries’ that do not to assume respon-
sibility for refugees’ protection on the long-term. The MoU with Jordan declares the 
country’s intent to strengthen its asylum institution (Article 2) and establish a domestic 
asylum system in the future (Article 14). On the other hand, Lebanon’s MoU clearly stipu-
lates that Lebanon does not consider itself  an asylum country due to social, economic and 
demographic considerations and to the presence of  Palestinian refugees. It goes as far as 
to specify that the term ‘asylum seeker’ shall mean ‘a person seeking asylum in a country 
other than Lebanon’ (preamble). The obligation to naturalise and integrate refugees is 
indeed the main political concern voiced by Jordanian and Lebanese authorities in refugee 
policy, along with the fear of  facilitating the permanent settlement of  Palestinian refugees.
The main purpose of  the MoUs is therefore to shift the responsibility of  refugee protection 
from host states to UNHCR in what Michael Kagan calls the ‘state-to-UN responsibility 
shift’.5 UNHCR is responsible for adjudicating asylum applications, granting refugee status, 
21/2 (2006); Khair Smadi, ‘Towards Adopting a Legal Asylum System in Jordan’, Fahamu Refugee Legal 
Aid Newsletter 11 (January 2011). Available at: http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/sites/srlan/
files/fileuploads/FRLAN11Jan2011.pdf.
3  ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between the General Directorate of  the General Security and the 
Regional Office of  UNHCR regarding the treatment of  persons seeking asylum with UNHCR office 
in Lebanon, Decree Number 11262 of  30 October 2003’, The Official Gazette of  the Republic of  Lebanon 
52, 13 November 2003.
4  ‘Statement on Lebanon–UNHCR Memorandum of  Understanding’, Frontiers Center (November 2003). 
Available at: http://www.frontiersruwad.org/pdf/FR_Public_Statement_MOU_Nov_2003.pdf.
5  Michael Kagan, ‘“We Live in a Country of  UNHCR”. The UN Surrogate State and Refugee Policy 
in the Middle East’, UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research 201 (February 2011). Available at: http://
www.unhcr.org/4d5a8cde9.pdf.
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securing a durable solution and meeting the socio-economic needs of  refugees. Host states’ 
obligations are limited to tolerating refugees’ presence temporarily on condition that they 
can be resettled to a third country.6 These temporary legal stays are distinct from regular 
residency schemes, and do not grant eligibility for long-term residence or for naturalisation. 
As such, the MoUs mainly impose responsibilities on UNHCR. The most problematic 
aspect in this regard is that they commit UNHCR to an obligation – the resettlement of 
refugees – for which it is not the decision maker. Resettlement countries, who are techni-
cally not parties to the MoUs, have an absolute discretion to accept refugees’ relocation.
This model of  state-to-UN responsibility shift has been prevailing in the Middle East 
since the 1950s when Arab states transferred the responsibility for the relief  of  Palestinian 
refugees to the United Nations Relief  and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA) as a means to guarantee their right of  return to Palestine and their 
non-integration in host countries. However, unlike UNHCR, UNRWA is not mandated 
to find durable solutions for refugees but is limited to providing aid until such a solution 
can be found. As such, the MoUs may have established an unprecedented legal anomaly 
in the dynamics of  UN versus host state responsibilities. 
An Informal Regime of ‘Tolerance’
The MoUs do not provide sufficient guarantees for the protection of  refugees but they 
grant host states a large margin of  discretion on how to fill these gaps. It can be argued 
that this discretion encouraged host states to show a certain degree of  leniency, often 
referred to as a ‘regime of  tolerance’.7 They often adopted a flexible approach towards 
the prolonged presence of  refugees through inconsistent and ad hoc protection measures, 
while at the same time blocking prospects for permanent settlement. 
The degree of  tolerance, however, appears to be determined by the level of  involvement 
of  the international community in searching for durable solutions. For example, Lebanese 
officials justify the prolonged detention of  refugees by the fact that it creates an incentive 
for resettlement. Similarly, Jordan’s mass deportation of  hundreds of  Sudanese refugees in 
December 2015 came at a time when there was little international interest in them.8 Both 
countries are concerned that a favourable refugee regime would create a pull factor for 
6  Lebanon limits refugees’ stay to a maximum of  one year starting from registration (Articles 5 & 
9). Jordan limited it to six months starting from UNHCR recognition of  refugee status (Article 5). In 
2014, the MoU was amended to extend the time limits from six months to one year for legal stay, and 
from 30 to 90 days for the refugee status determination for detained asylum seekers. See: Khetam 
Malkawi, ‘Gov’t, UNHCR Sign Amendment to Cooperation Memo’, The Jordan Times, 31 May 2014. 
Available at: http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/gov%E2%80%99t-unhcr-sign-amendments-co-
operation-memo.
7  Jeff  Crisp, Jane Janz, José Riera and Shahira Samy, ‘Surviving in the City: A Review of  UNHCR’s 
operations for Iraqi refugees in urban areas in Jordan, Libya and Syria’, UNHCR PDES (July 2009). 
Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d1d93672.html.
8  ‘UNHCR Operational Update, Jordan’, UNHCR (February 2016). Available at: https://data.unhcr.
org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=10564.
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refugees in the region9 and reduce the chances of  their resettlement. This regime of  ‘toler-
ance’ mainly relies on maintaining refugees in a precarious status and subjecting them to 
exclusionary policies that ensure their visibility to the international community and their 
invisibility to the local population. This can be measured in the following aspects:
• Non-refoulement: Persons recognised by UNHCR to be in need of  international 
protection are not automatically protected by the host states from refoulement. Both 
MoUs imply that host states maintain the discretion to deport a recognised refugee 
following the expiry of  the time limit stipulated in the MoU. In practice, authorities 
have shown a relative flexibility regarding these time limits but maintain the threat 
of  refoulement at all times. In addition, both Jordan and Lebanon rely on a systematic 
practice of  prolonged administrative detention in order to force refugees to return 
to their countries of  origin and, at the same time, pressure UNHCR to secure faster 
resettlement. 
• Legal status: Refugee status granted by UNHCR does not automatically grant legal 
residence or stay in the host country. The MoUs stipulate that refugees registered with 
UNHCR can obtain a temporary legal status pending their resettlement, but refugees 
have rarely benefited from this status. In Lebanon, they can obtain a circulation per-
mit valid for a maximum of  one year, but these permits were not systematically issued 
by the immigration authorities. In Jordan, the Ministry of  Interior adds its stamp to 
UNHCR refugee card, but UNHCR often delayed this certification process until reset-
tlement can be secured. As a result, refugees have a precarious legal status in the host 
countries and are treated similar to other migrants. Despite the absence of  systematic 
or mass arrests, refugees are constantly at risk of  arrest for immigration violations. 
• Right to work: Under the MoUs, UNHCR has the primary responsibility to meet 
the socio-economic needs of  refugees (Article 11 Jordan, Article 14 Lebanon). Refu-
gees’ access to work is severely limited as a means to restrict their capacity for self-reli-
ance and to maintain them in constant dependency on international aid. The official 
discourse refers to host countries’ need to prevent labour competition and unem-
ployment. As a result, refugees often resort to making a living in the informal market 
among the economically marginalised local communities. Authorities show a relative 
leniency towards these forms of  unauthorised foreign labour, but this isolates refugees 
from formal economies and puts them at risk of  arrest for working illegally. 
Challenges of Large-Scale Displacement
At the time of  signature of  the MoUs, there were less than 5,000 registered refugees and 
asylum seekers with UNHCR in Jordan10 and around 3,000 in Lebanon.11 The MoUs 
9  Lebanon included a provision in the MoU whereby UNHCR, in its capacity as a regional office, com-
mits to address the problem of  asylum seekers prior to their arrival to Lebanon (Article 19).
10  ‘Refugees and Others of  Concern to UNHCR’, UNHCR (1998). Available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/statistics/unhcrstats/3bfa31ac1/refugees-others-concern-unhcr-1998-statistical-overview.html.
11 ‘2003 Global Refugee Trends’, UNHCR (15 June 2004). Available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/40d015fb4.html.
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were therefore not designed to respond to situations of  large-scale forced migration or to 
protracted refugee situations.12
As a result, the MoUs were inadequate tools to respond to the mass influx of  refugees 
from Iraq after 2003 and Syria after 2011. In both instances, UNHCR adopted group-
based mechanisms, which suspended the individual processing of  asylum applications 
and resettlement. This resulted in a de facto partial suspension of  the MoUs, at minimum 
regarding the expectation of  swift resettlement. Jordan and Lebanon, however, continue 
to hold on to the MoUs as working documents.
In response to the Iraqi refugees’ influx, Jordan13 and Lebanon14 adopted restrictive poli-
cies, which refused to consider Iraqis as ‘refugees’ and denied them legal status, subjecting 
them to arrests, prolonged detention and ultimately refoulement when resettlement could 
not be secured.
However, the countries’ response to the Syrian refugees’ influx exceeded their commit-
ment under the MoUs. Jordan considers Syrians to be ‘refugees’,15 although it does not 
require a durable solution to be found within the MoU time limit. According to UNHCR, 
this provision only acts to establish that the stay in Jordan is temporary.16 Yet, in 2014, 
the Jordan MoU was amended to extend the time limits, indicating a clear intention 
from the government to maintain its refugee policy in the framework of  the MoU despite 
challenges to its implementation. Lebanon, on the other hand, considers that the Syrian 
refugee crisis falls outside the scope of  the MoU and refers to Syrian refugees as ‘nazihun’, 
a term that usually refers to internally displaced persons. In this context, both countries 
increased their involvement in the responsibilities that were transferred to UNHCR by the 
MoUs, mainly to control registration. Jordan is operating its own registration process for 
Syrian refugees and imposed limitations on UNHCR registration.17 Lebanon gradually 
12  The Jordan MoU specifies that both parties would establish a coordination mechanism to respond 
to the emergency when a situation of  mass influx arises (Article 12) while the Lebanon MoU did not 
foresee such a situation.
13  Jordan signed a Letter of  Understanding with UNHCR in April 2003 establishing a temporary 
protection regime for Iraqi refugees in safe facilities in the border area, mainly in Al-Ruwaished refugee 
camp. See: ‘Letter of  Understanding between the Government of  the Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan 
and the Office of  UNHCR’, UN Treaty Series 2222 (15 April 2003), p. 207. Available at: https://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202222/v2222.pdf. 
14  Lebanon rejected the temporary protection and prima facie regimes for Iraqis and expected UNHCR 
to resettle all Iraqi refugees. See: Samira Trad and Ghida Frangieh, ‘Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon: Con-
tinuous Lack of  Protection’, Forced Migration Review Special Issue (June 2007). Available at: http://www.
fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/Iraq/15.pdf.
15  Saleh Al-Kilani, ‘A Duty and a Burden on Jordan’, Forced Migration Review 47 (September 2014). Avail-
able at: http://www.fmreview.org/syria/alkilani.html.
16  Susan M. Akram et al, Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing (Boston Uni-
versity School of  Law, 2015). Available at: http://www.bu.edu/law/files/2015/07/FINALFullReport.pdf.
17  In July 2014, Jordan requested UNHCR to stop issuing asylum seekers certificates for those who 
left the camps without government approval (i.e. without providing a sponsor as part of  the bailout 
program). See: ‘Regional Analysis: Syria Q4 2014, 1 October–31 December 2014’, Strategic Needs Anal-
ysis Project (2014). Available at: http://www.acaps.org/country/jordan/special-reports#container-682; 
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instructed UNHCR to limit the number of  registered Syrians until it finally prohibited 
UNHCR from registering new refugees in May 2015.18 
Both countries have also adopted some favourable protection measures in this context:
• Legal status: Jordan considers registered Syrian refugees to have legal stay. Leb-
anon, on the other hand, adopted restrictive regulations in January 2015,19 which 
resulted in a loss of  legal status for more than two-thirds of  Syrian refugees. Lebanon 
granted some refugees a legal stay on the basis of  UNHCR certificates in return for a 
pledge not to work. This was the first time that UNHCR registration granted refugees 
the right to stay in the country outside the scope of  the MoU. 
• Refoulement: Lebanon suspended the deportation of  refugees from Syria (including 
Palestinians) since August 2012. Although some isolated cases were reported,20 it is the 
strongest commitment Lebanon has ever shown to the principle of  non-refoulement. This 
is nonetheless hindered by a systematic policy of  issuing deportation orders against 
Syrians, which are not forcibly executed but result in a loss of  legal status and the risk 
of  criminal prosecution.21 In Jordan, several instances of  deportation of  refugees from 
Syria have been reported, including children, injured people and Palestinian refugees 
from Syria.22 It appears that deportees are sent back to opposition-held areas where 
violence is widespread.23
Luigi Achilli, ‘Syrian Refugees in Jordan, a Reality Check’, Migration Policy Center, European University Centre 
(February 2015). Available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34904/MPC_2015-02_
PB.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
18  ‘Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, Lebanon Country Page’, Syria Regional Refugee Response. 
Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.
19  Filippo Dionigi, ‘The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience’, LSE 
Middle East Center Paper Series 15 (February 2016). Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/
publications/Paper-Series/2016/FilippoDionigi.aspx.
20  ‘Submission by UNHCR for the OHCHR Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: Leb-
anon, UNHCR (March 2015). Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5638627ad.html; 
‘Lebanon: Syrian Forcibly Returned to Syria’, Human Rights Watch, 7 November 2014. Available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/07/lebanon-syrian-forcibly-returned-syria; ‘Two Syrians Disap-
pear, Feared Deported’, Human Rights Watch, 17 February 2015. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/
news/2015/02/17/lebanon-2-syrians-disappear-feared-deported.
21  Ghida Frangieh, ‘Forced Departure: How Lebanon Evades the International Principle of  Non-Re-
foulement’, Legal Agenda, 29 December 2014. Available at: http://www.english.legal-agenda.com/
article.php?id=675&lang=en; ‘No Escape: Civilians in Syria Struggle to Find Safety Across Borders’, 
Norwegian Refugee Council and International Rescue Committee, 13 November 2014. Available at: http://www.
nrc.no/?did=9187319.
22  ‘Submission by UNHCR for the OHCHR’ Compilation Report – Universal Periodic Review: Jordan’, 
UNHCR (March 2013). Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/513d90172.html; Regional Anal-
ysis: Syria, supra at 17; ‘Jordan: Vulnerable Syrian Refugees Forcibly Returned to Syria’, Human Rights 
Watch, 23 November 2014. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/23/jordan-vulnera-
ble-refugees-forcibly-returned-syria.
23  ‘Jordan: Syrian Medical Workers Deported’, Human Rights Watch, 8 December 2014. Available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/08/jordan-syrian-medical-workers-deported.
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Conclusion
The refusal of  Jordan and Lebanon to assume long-term responsibility for refugees is the 
major obstacle against establishing a stable and favourable refugee protection regime. 
The MoUs did not provide sufficient guarantees for refugees, nor did they establish 
mechanisms to deal with large-scale displacement. They are limited to finding temporary 
solutions to refugees during their transit through Jordan and Lebanon. 
The state-to-UN responsibility shift operated by the MoUs limits host states’ responsibil-
ity for refugee management and protection. Yet, in practice, Jordan and Lebanon have 
adopted informal asylum regimes that exceed their MoUs commitments. These are char-
acterised by ad hoc measures of  tolerance towards the prolonged presence of  refugees 
on their territories while maintaining dependency on the international community and 
obstacles against local integration. This is generally achieved through exclusionary and 
dehumanising policies that ensure refugees’ visibility to the international community while 
simultaneously maintaining their invisibility to the local population, such as encampment, 
detention, precarious legal statuses and confinement to informal economies.
Currently, host states are committed to maintaining these MoUs as the only legal frame-
work for their refugee policies, despite the challenges to their implementation, as evidenced 
by Jordan’s recent amendment. The magnitude of  the Syrian crisis has, for the time being, 
blocked all attempts for legal change. The renegotiation process for a new Lebanon MoU 
is on hold, so is Jordan’s draft law for a comprehensive asylum regime. In this context, the 
international response to the Syrian refugee crisis will shape future refugee policies in the 
Middle East. 
A key aspect of  these policies is the dynamics between the principles of  host states 
responsibility and that of  global responsibility sharing. The MoUs and their imperfect 
implementation tell us that host states are willing to provide minimum protection to ref-
ugees as long as their long-term responsibility visibly lies elsewhere and as long as the 
international community is seriously engaged in finding a durable solution. 
In this context, the state-to-UN responsibility shift acts as a means to operate the principle 
of  shared responsibility. A new approach to the concept of  host state responsibility and 
to the division of  responsibilities between host states and the international community 
is therefore needed, beyond the traditional approaches limited to assessing host states’ 
capacity or uncompliant legal frameworks. 
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Introduction 
Rabia, a Syrian refugee in Lebanon, lives out of  wedlock with a man who regularly 
beats and abuses her. After fleeing Syria, her husband disappeared and her neigh-
bour threatened to hurt her son if  she did not move in with him and do as he says. 
Rabia fell pregnant with her abuser’s child and her daughter was born stateless. 
Syrian law doesn’t allow her to pass her nationality to her baby, and with no legal link to a 
father, the baby could not become Syrian. Rabia is also worried about going back to Syria, 
especially with the many checkpoints that she would have to cross in Lebanon on her way 
there. Rabia’s daughter is stateless, and therefore Rabia cannot leave.1
Rabia’s story is not unique. Statelessness2 is a challenge and a threat in any country, how-
ever, when families and individuals become displaced, the risks and consequences increase 
substantially. The Syrian refugee context has become protracted and has brought with it 
a convergence of  different factors that make it a perfect platform for statelessness risks 
and consequences to be heightened. These factors include containing a large population 
of  already stateless refugees, discriminatory nationality laws, complicated personal status 
regulations of  neighbouring countries and state officials extremely sensitive to the two 
words ‘nationality’ and ‘refugee’. Especially with no clear vision as to what a future ‘Syria’ 
will look like and what a future ‘Syrian national’ will embody, the need to understand and 
address the risks families like Rabia’s face is paramount. This paper aims to explore in 
greater detail how the nexus between displacement and statelessness has become prob-
lematic among the displaced from Syria, and to look at ways the humanitarian response 
to the Syria crisis allows better understanding of  the problems of  statelessness. 
The information in this paper mainly stems from a project being carried out by the Institute on State-
lessness and Inclusion and the Norwegian Refugee Council, that looks at how emergency response 
organisations respond to the challenges of  statelessness and the risk of  statelessness in the displacement 
context, and what they could be doing to resolve some of  these issues. The project takes a regional per-
spective but this paper is based on the information obtained from field research in Lebanon. 
1  The name and some of  the information of  this story have been modified to protect the identity of 
the family.
2  The international legal definition of  ‘statelessness’ is: ‘A person who is not considered a national by any 
State under the operation of  its law.’ Article 1 of  the 1954 Convention on the Status of  Statelessness. 
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The paper will look at three sets of  groups within the displaced population: the general 
refugee population, those at high risk of  statelessness and the stateless refugees. 
The General Refugee Population
The majority of  refugees, including children born in exile, hold Syrian nationality, and 
the risk of  statelessness is non-existent or marginal. However, experience from other refu-
gee situations around the world demonstrates how the recognition of  nationality for some 
refugees following protracted displacement and/or for children born in exile can have 
consequences. An example of  this could be the case of  Liberia, where there are reports of 
the government refusing the return of  some refugees as they are no longer able to prove 
their link to the country. The consequences of  not protecting this link through documen-
tation can hamper future efforts to realise durable solutions. 
As part of  the ongoing humanitarian response in Lebanon, it seems this is slowly begin-
ning to be understood. There are many good examples of  what is being done to prevent 
statelessness among the general population – humanitarian organisations are seeing the 
documentation of  the displaced as a priority. Counselling, legal assistance and public 
awareness campaigns on documentation are rife.3 
Obstacles to this however remain on several fronts, some of  the main being:
• There remains a lack of  understanding among some stakeholders and authorities that 
the documenting of  a refugee population plays no role in the eventual naturalisation 
of  that population in the host country. Lebanon has a very sensitive view towards nat-
uralisation,4 however it is yet to be made clear that documenting the population does 
exactly the opposite – it confirms their Syrian nationality.
• Public awareness among the displaced population on the civil registration procedures is 
limited. In Lebanon the procedures differ significantly to those in Syria, and are much 
more complicated. These procedures become increasingly difficult to navigate when 
families are in a precarious situation and not prioritising registration of  events such as 
marriages and births. Some processes, such as birth registration, have a temporal dead-
line which leaves little space for mistakes when families are unaware of  the procedures. 
• Most importantly, even when individuals are aware of  the procedures and have no 
obstacles accessing them, the most predominant obstacles to accessing the civil regis-
tration system are the complexities of  the Lebanese infrastructure, mostly prohibitive 
fees and requirements and the lack of  uniformity of  regulations across organisations. 
Registering a birth, for example, involves five steps and each step requires different 
3  Some examples of  organisations carrying this work out are: UNHCR, the Norwegian Refugee Coun-
cil (NRC), Frontiers Ruwad, the Lebanese Organization of  Studies and Training (LOST), Oxfam, 
Caritas, INTERSOS. 
4  For more information on this sensitive issue see: Laura vanWaas, ‘Citizenship, Statelessness and the 
Numbers Game in Lebanon’, Tilburg Law School (December 2014). Available at: http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2550734.
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documents and fees to be paid.5 If  these steps are not completed, then the case will 
have to be taken to court – often a prohibitively costly and lengthy process.
Another development is the questions surrounding the ‘new’ documents appearing – mainly 
those produced by the Syrian Coalition (Iʾtilaf) but also by Islamic State (IS). Here, we 
see the development of  regional politics of  the (de)legitimisation of  regimes being played 
out through the (un)recognition of  certain documents. Some Lebanese religious judges of 
particular ideologies are accepting Iʾtilaf  documents, for example, some Syrian sheikhs in 
Lebanon have even given themselves the authority to produce these documents, where in 
other areas possessing these documents is seen as highly fraudulent. Some figures in Arsal 
are accepting IS documents, which would be fraudulent in most other areas. The Lebanese 
government does not accept these documents. However, their acceptance and/or the (de)
legitimisation of  them are decisions that are being made locally on an ad hoc basis.
The High Risk Groups
Due to the law and policy framework which applies to the displaced – in Syria and in the 
host country – a small minority of  refugees find it increasingly difficult to protect their 
enjoyment of  Syrian nationality. Factors which have created a heightened risk of  stateless-
ness for a small sub-set of  the Syrian refugee population include gender discrimination in 
the nationality law of  Syria and, as discussed above, the barriers obstructing birth/civil 
registration for some children in refugee-hosting states. As a result, there are significant 
challenges accessing nationality for, among others: 
• Children born within female-headed households: Only a male can pass his 
nationality on to his child in Syria. In Lebanon twenty percent of  Syrian refugee 
households are headed by women – where the male head is not present.6 When there 
is no valid and legal proof  of  the female’s marriage to a Syrian national, the children 
of  these female Syrian refugees are at risk of  becoming stateless.
• Undocumented: Many families come to Lebanon without any documents, they 
may have left them behind or lost them during flight. Additionally, there were many 
reported cases of  the loss of  documents taking place in Lebanon – especially as the 
informal tent settlements, which are particularly susceptible to floods and fires. Along-
side this, there are many couples and families who had never obtained documents in 
Syria – such as official marriage or birth certificates. Being undocumented makes it 
incredibly difficult to access further documents. 
• Children of  Palestinian Refugees from Syria: There are an estimated 45,000 
Palestinian refugees who have fled from Syria registered with the United Nations 
5  For extensive information on the obstacles to birth registration see: ‘Birth Registration Update’, Nor-
wegian Refugee Council (2015). Available at: http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9192872.pdf.
6  ‘Lebanon: Refugee Women from Syria Face Heightened Risk of  Exploitation and Sexual Harass-
ment’, Amnesty International (2016). Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/02/
lebanon-refugee-women-from-syria-face-heightened-risk-of-exploitation-and-sexual-harassment/.
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Relief  and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Lebanon.7 Difficulties arise when they have 
children born on Lebanese territory. In order to register their child with UNRWA, 
they can only do this through the office in Syria, which can be a complicated and 
often impossible procedure. 
• Children turning 15 in Lebanon: When a Syrian child turns 15, he must obtain 
the Syrian identity card. However, as a refugee in Lebanon, they are unable to do this 
as they might be unable to access the Syrian authorities. Even if  they come from a 
family that is well-documented, they will not be able to obtain an ID. 
• Refugees not registered with UNHCR: There are no official statistics, however 
media reports have cited that the number of  Syrians living in Lebanon who have not 
registered with UNHCR range between 200,000 and 400,000, with the figure grow-
ing as registration has stopped.8 When looking at other historical examples of  the 
identification of  refugees for return policy, for example for the Black Mauritanians in 
Senegal,9 UNHCR registration is often at the forefront of  identifying individuals who 
had fled. 
Stateless Refugees
Some of  those displaced were stateless prior to the crisis. UNHCR states that approx-
imately 0.2 percent of  Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon have been identified as 
stateless which translates into several thousands. However, the actual number is probably 
much higher due to the low level of  self-identification and as many of  them will not have 
registered with UNHCR. The main stateless groups that were identified are:
• Stateless Kurds (Ajanib and Maktoumeen): The Stateless Kurds are a minority of  Kurds 
in Syria and their descendants who were denationalised in 1962.10 
• Maktoumeen: The maktoumeen are families who were never registered in Syria for gener-
ations – initially and predominantly for reasons of  avoiding military service or being 
excluded from inheritance. 
• As a consequence of  the gender discrimination in Syrian nationality law, although no 
statistics exist, thoses who may have been born in Syria or, as in the case of  Rabia’s 
daughter, in exile. 
7  ‘Refugees from Syria: Lebanon’, UNHCR (2015).
8  Dalya Mitri, ‘Challenges of  Aid Coordination in a Complex Crisis: An Overview of  Funding Policies 
and Conditions Regarding Aid Provision to Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, Civil Society Knowledge Center, 
Lebanon Support, 5 March 2014. Available at: http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/paper/challenges-aid-coor-
dination-complex-crisis.
9  For more information on the issue of  Mauritians stateless refugees see: ‘The World’s Stateless’, 
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (December 2014), p. 115. Available at: http://www.institutesi.org/
worldsstateless.pdf.
10  For more information on this group please see: Zahra Albarazi, ‘The Stateless Syrians’, Tilburg 
Law School Research Paper 11 (2013). Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2269700. 
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• There are anecdotal reports by Syrian refugees claiming that the Syrian government 
have rejected their attempts to renew documents as they are ‘no longer citizens’, be-
lieving it was because they were part of  the opposition groups.11 
For the individuals who have the labels of  both stateless and refugees, which includes tens 
of  thousands in Lebanon alone, the full consequences of  this status are yet to be identified 
or understood. 
Conclusion
In a country where authorities are hyper-sensitive to the issue of  nationality and naturali-
sation, organisations have distanced themselves from that controversy and are practically 
working on the issue. Work on the general prevention of  statelessness and access to civil 
documentation for refugees is incredibly developed and having tangible results on the 
ground. However, there are still major gaps in ensuring all refugees are documented, in 
aiding groups that are at high risk of  statelessness, and in ensuring the protection of  rights 
of  the stateless. 
Long before the start of  the Syrian conflict, the situation of  stateless persons residing in 
Lebanon was dire – they are denied access to many basic rights such as the right to work 
in the formal sector, access to social security or to sit official school exams.12 Being stateless 
and a refugee complicates the issue even further. The main challenges that they identified 
were that they had to enter the country illegally, restricted movement inside the country 
due to checkpoints and their inability to access other documents. As well as the potential 
problems of  return to Syria that a stateless refugee may face, not being able to prove Syria 
as their country of  origin, local integration into a community that is already highly hostile 
to both the stateless and refugees may be incredibly difficult. Additionally, other conse-
quences, such as in the case of  Rabia the fear of  leaving the village or return to Syria, are 
substantial consequences of  this lack of  status. 
11  Syrian nationality law gives the state broad powers to deprive nationality – for example, nationality 
can be withdrawn due to prolonged absence from the country. 
12  For more information on the human rights situation of  the stateless in Lebanon see: ‘Invisible 
Citizens, A Legal Study on Statelessness in Lebanon’, Frontiers Ruwad (2009). Available at: http://
www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/sites/srlan/files/fileuploads/Invisible_Citizens_-_A_Legal_
Study_on_Statelessness_in_Lebanon_Nov_2009.pdf; and ‘The Statelessness in Lebanon: Between 
Shame and Shadows’, Legal Agenda (2016). Available at: http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.
php?id=741&lang=en.
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Introduction
Any thoughtful examination of  the last five years of  fighting in Syria raises questions 
about how we think about gender, and particularly men, during conflict.1 The media and 
reports by non-governmental associations repeatedly report that 75 percent of  Syrian 
refugees are women and children. What they fail to do, however, is examine the statistics. 
Just over 50 percent of  the refugees are children, and thus slightly less than 50 percent 
are adults. The statistics also show, with variation among host countries, that about half 
the adults are women and half  are men; thus indeed, some 75 percent of  the refugees are 
women and children. But equally, 75 percent of  the refugees are men and children. Yet 
that statistic is never cited as significant, nor is it used to stir empathy for the refugees or 
create policy and programming. 
Why are we so unwilling to describe men as vulnerable or in need of  protection? It is true 
that the vast majority of  those engaged in the fighting are men – whether on the side of 
the Syrian regime or among the myriad of  armed opposition groups. But what about the 
millions of  men who have chosen not to fight? Understanding the choices made by those 
men who remove themselves – and their families – from conflict allows a window into the 
lives of  a much larger portion of  Syrians. These people tell a very different story about 
the conflict in Syria, and they too should be represented, their experiences respected, 
and assistance programmes developed for them. In cases of  conflict, as is ongoing in 
Syria, a more holistic approach to understanding gendered vulnerabilities will allow us to 
Much of  this research was conducted with Abbie Taylor (formerly of  ISIM, Georgetown University) 
and funded by Georgetown University grants. I have worked with her and Emma Murphy to develop 
the ideas, written work, and bibliography for the larger project on Syrian men fleeing conscription and 
military service, on which this work is based.
1  Cynthia Enloe’s early work described how ‘womenandchildren’ are lumped together, collectivising 
them as victims or vulnerable. See: Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of  the Cold 
War (University of  California Press, 1993). Later scholars developed our understanding of  subjects such 
as ‘gendercide’, in the work of  Adam Jones. See: Adam Jones, ‘Pity the Innocent Men: We are Outraged 
when Innocent Women and Children are Injured or Killed in War Zones, yet the Slaughter of  Civilian 
Men Raises Nary a Complaint’, The Globe and Mail, 20 Feb 1999; and R. Charli Carpenter, ‘Recogniz-
ing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations’, Security Dialogue 37/1 
(London: Sage Publications, 2006), pp. 83–103. More recently, internet-based writings have addressed 
some of  the issues of  males fleeing conflict and men as victims. See: https://politicalviolenceataglance.
org/2013/07/11/male-victimhood-in-armed-conflict/. 
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develop better programming for men, which will only improve the abilities of  women and 
children, indeed all Syrians, to weather war, displacement, unemployment, exploitative 
circumstances, illness and trauma. 
Understanding why men choose to not fight in the conflict also provokes us to think about 
how host governments, the UN system and the international community might better 
deal with non-combatant men. This is not to suggest that men should be prioritised over 
women, children or any of  the other categories that address those needing assistance. 
But it is to suggest that better consideration of  the plight of  men of  military age2 would 
allow humanitarian actors to play a critical role in removing people from combat – both 
potential or real combatants and victims. Given the roles that international actors are 
playing in fueling and/or observing the fighting and the inability or unwillingness of  the 
international community to stop the conflict, helping to provide solutions for individuals 
who choose not to fight is a small but important step that the humanitarian aid commu-
nity could take.
According to international law, non-combatant men are civilians, just as are the women, 
children and elderly who have fled the fighting.3 And yet, in the last five years, we have 
seen host governments prevent them from crossing into their countries legally out of  fear 
that this male demographic brings the conflict with them and endanger their own citi-
zens.4 Similarly, post-2014, migration flows have seen both a disproportionate number 
of  men entering via Italy and Greece and expressions of  concern about what this demo-
graphic will mean for Europe.5 
In short, the last five years have seen men of  military-age considered by virtue of  their 
gender as potential combatants and/or a source of  danger and instability. This demo-
graphic characterisation means that even if  a man does not have weapons and is not 
engaged in fighting, he is assumed, at the very least, to be willing or able to fight. He is 
therefore seen either as an asset or a threat – to the regime, the opposition movements or 
2  Here, the term ‘military-age men’ means men aged 15–55, based on the Syrian regime’s designation 
during the Homs evacuations in February 2014. The range may be broader and include all those con-
sidered ‘able-bodied’ men. It should also be noted that eligible age for service in the Syrian army has 
been between 18–42.
3  Non-combatant civilians include those who were never involved in armed conflict. According to 
international law guidelines, particularly those established after 1999, any armed elements, including 
ex-combatants, are to be disarmed, separated, and interred by the host state. It is challenging and time 
consuming, however, for the host state to determine if  someone is a combatant or ex-combatant if  the 
person is not wearing military clothing or does not reveal his or her status. Thus, we see broader policies 
aimed at excluding single men as a broad sweep. 
4  In Jordan, it has become a de facto policy that single men cannot legally enter the country alone, 
thus forcing them to either cross with their family members or to try and cross illegally, with all of  the 
dangers that such journeys bring. See the story of  a Syrian man named Bashar: Sara Obeidat and 
Hussam Da’anah, ‘First Days at Azraq Syrian Refugee Camp’, 7iber. Available at: http://www.7iber.
org/2014/05/arriving-at-azraq-camp/.
5  According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), migrant men traveling to Europe 
in the summer of  2015 made up 66 percent of  the total. See: https://www.iom.int/news/mediter-
ranean-western-balkans-update-new-numbers-italy-greece-fyrom. See also, for example: http://www.
politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/europe-refugees-migrant-crisis-men-213500 
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the governments of  host countries. His demographic characteristics trump his ability to 
define himself  as a civilian by his actions and beliefs.
Conscription in Syria 
Men of  military-age living inside the regime-controlled areas of  Syria face mandatory 
conscription into the Syrian military, beginning at age 18, with the potential to be called 
for reserve duty until the age of  42 or so.6 Prior to the beginning of  the uprising, mil-
itary service was not a huge issue of  concern for most Syrian men. Service was what 
every man did, unless he requested an exemption due to being the family’s only son or 
for medical reasons based on designated health criteria. Other options included, if  he 
had enough money, the purchase of  an exemption, which ranged between $7,000 and 
$15,000, depending on his country of  residence.7 If  he was studying at university or col-
lege, he received an automatic postponement. Even after graduation, especially if  he was 
working abroad or for the government, he could request another year-long postpone-
ment, renewable for up to five years. Once conscripted, men with university degrees were 
assigned desk jobs that they were often able to avoid with small financial payments to their 
commanding officers. Men without these educational credentials served the full 18–24 
months as soldiers.8 
Fleeing Conflict 
In 2011, the violent response by the regime to the uprising caused many men to recon-
sider service in the Syrian military. Following the formation of  the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) in late July 2011, the FSA and other militarised opposition groups’ ranks soon filled 
by men wanting to fight against the regime, and thus deserted from the Syrian military or 
joined before being formally conscripted or after having served. In addition, the swelling 
numbers of  the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees are filled with men who 
have fled into the areas of  Syria that the regime does not control or into other countries, 
particularly as the regime’s violence spread and intensified. 
The statistics on refugees are particularly revealing here. Since mid-2012, they show that 
men are not staying behind in large numbers to fight, but rather fleeing in nearly equal 
numbers to women of  the same age groups. As of  August 2016, the UN Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) and the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) 
reported 4.8 million Syrian refugees registered with their agencies (2 million more than 
in 2014). Of  that total, 50.3 percent are male, and 49.7 percent are female. Among them, 
6  ‘Military service is compulsory and regulated by law’ according to Article 40 of  the 1973 Constitution 
of  Syria. For more details as of  2007 see: http://www.refworld.org/docid/47d6547928.html. Updates 
can be found here: http://www.almjhar.com/ar-sy/NewsView/7/103356.aspx. 
7  Information on purchasing an exemption for Syrians outside the country is provided by the Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs: http://tinyurl.com/zpn7b21.
8  Much of  this information was conveyed to me in interviews on the topic with Syrian men in Leb-
anon and Turkey. Other details about conscription can be found here: http://www.refworld.org/
docid/47d6547928.html.
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21.6 percent are men aged 18–59 (1.040 million), while 22.5 percent are women (1.083 
million) of  the same demographic, a difference of  40,000 more adult women.9 However, 
among 0–17 year-olds, boys make up 27.1 percent (1.305 million) and girls represent 24.8 
percent (1.194 million), a difference of  111,000 more boys than girls.10 Added should 
be the estimates of  numbers killed – varying between 200,000 and 400,000 – with men 
making up 90 percent of  them over the last five years (in large part because they are the 
ones doing the fighting).11 In summary, there are demographic differences between which 
age groups have fled the country; however, the overall male/female ratio of  Syrian refu-
gees has consistently been almost equal over the years. What the numbers also push us to 
question is why are there so many more boys than girls under 18 registered as refugees.12 
Syrian men and women interviewed for this research and living as refugees in neighbour-
ing countries recalled stories from their own families’ experiences fleeing Syria.13 These 
accounts shed light on the particular vulnerability of  men and boys in conflict, the role 
of  conscription in forced migration and the personal choices people make to not pick up 
arms.14 The political ideologies of  those interviewed were mixed, but many of  them were 
clear about being unwilling to join the fighting, because they did not believe in what the 
regime was doing, they saw it as a personal death sentence, or they did not want to pick 
up arms for anyone. Numerous people said the turning point for them was when an officer 
knocked on their door with a conscription notice for themselves, their son or brother. A 
24-year old man from the village of  Jasim now living in Irbid, Jordan said: 
‘I left Syria because I wouldn’t go into the army after I saw them occupying cities 
and killing people. Of  course, military service is mandatory, and currently, the 
army is controlling cities, towns and villages – basically occupying them. I wasn’t 
in the army, and nor was I involved with the [Free Syrian Army] FSA noth-
ing, other than peaceful protests. In this situation, the security [apparatus] would 
come and make me a conscript of  the army.’15
9 ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response’, UNHCR. Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/
regional.php (accessed 4 August 2016). Turkey and Iraq have more male refugees registered than 
female, while Jordan and Lebanon have more female refugees registered. Iraq has had more Syrian 
male refugees than female since the movement started, but the higher male numbers are new in Turkey 
and likely a result of  Syrians intending to go to Europe now being stuck in Turkey.
10  The numbers, rounded up, are from UNHCR statistics on registered refugees, recognising all of  the 
limitations and issues with these numbers, like undercounting of  those displaced, etc.
11  All those killed are named and detailed here: http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/martyrs. Based 
on their records as of  15 April 2016, 10,112 women (+5,189 girls), 106,993 men (+11,026 boys) have 
been killed (of  the men, 68,200 are reported as civilians). Other estimates are available here: http://
scpr-syria.org/publications/policy-reports/confronting-fragmentation/.
12  The differences are fairly equally distributed across each of  the recorded age groups 0–4, 5–11, 
11–17. See: ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response’ (accessed 4 August 2016).
13  Research for the project was conducted in 2013–2015 in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, and consists 
of  150 qualitative interviews.
14  Some accounts are published in Rochelle Davis, Abbie Taylor and Emma Murphy, ‘Gender, Con-
scription and Protection, and The War in Syria’, Forced Migration Review 47 (September 2014), pp. 35–38.
15  Author interview, Irbid, Jordan (June 2013). For more information on how these interviews were con-
ducted, see Rochelle Davis and Abbie Taylor, ‘Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: A Snapshot from 
Summer 2013’, Georgetown University (January 2014). Available at: http://www.alnap.org/resource/10089.
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Others interviewed were college students whose military exemption had expired, either 
because their universities were closed, their houses destroyed, or they had to cancel their 
studies. A few spoke of  friends and neighbours whose sons went into hiding or ‘faked’ 
abduction or death so as to avoid conscription. Additionally, men reported defecting from 
the Syrian army because they were commanded to fire on Syrian non-violent civilian 
protestors, among other reasons.16 For most men of  military age, the consideration to stay 
in Syria meant either taking up arms to fight or trying to avoid the military through legal 
and illegal means, subterfuge and living on the run. If  caught, those avoiding military ser-
vice face prolonged detention, torture and even execution. Thus, many either chose – or 
their families forced them – to flee to neighbouring countries or to non-regime-controlled 
areas within Syria. In addition, because the regime continually changes policies regarding 
exemptions, reserve duty, conscription, and postponements, and often applies them arbi-
trarily, many Syrian men express fear and hesitation to remain within Syria and to try to 
navigate the system legally. 
According to at least some of  those men who have fled, they tried multiple times to 
enter the host countries and succeeded by either getting their families to cross with 
them, or by crossing illegally with or without smugglers, which they often have to do at 
great risk and expense.17 Finally, it is nearly impossible to know how many have been 
unable or unwilling to flee, and how many have been forced to stay in Syria and become 
embroiled in the fighting.
Vulnerable and Unprotected: Possible Changes 
There is no larger policy at present to address men fleeing conscription and fighting put 
forth by host governments, UNHCR or other humanitarian actors. Those who are able 
to flee to non-regime controlled areas or to other countries, find safety, at least. However, 
the few cases of  those forced to return, as well as the multiple hurdles men face in trying 
to flee Syria, especially those put up by host countries, and specific aid programming for 
16  A 25-year old from Daraʿa living in Irbid said, ‘I’m a defector from Bashar Assad’s regime, and 
currently I live in Jordan. I was doing my service in [a particular] battalion. I defected because of 
the repressive practices used by Bashar’s army towards citizens, beginning with the repression of  the 
protests, attacks on them and the shelling by heavy artillery and warplanes. I live in Irbid because my 
brother has been here since the beginning of  2011 in order to pursue his studies, and now I live with 
him.’ Author interview, Irbid, Jordan (June 2013). 
17  ‘Syria’s Northern Border Open to Smugglers for the Right Price’, Al Akhbar English, 5 August 2013. 
Available at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/16643; ‘Iraq/Jordan/Turkey: Syrians Blocked from 
Fleeing War’, Human Rights Watch, 1 July 2013. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/01/
iraqjordanturkey-syrians-blocked-fleeing-war; ‘Growing Restrictions, Tough Conditions: The Plight 
of  those Fleeing Syria to Jordan’, Amnesty International, 31 October 2013, p. 10. Available at: https://
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE16/003/2013/en/; ‘International Failure: The Syrian Refu-
gee Crisis’, Amnesty International, 13 December 2013. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/
asset/ACT34/001/2013/ar/8a376b76-d031-48a6-9588-ed9aee651d52/act340012013en.pdf; and 
Ursula Lindsey, ‘The Zaatari Refugee Camp’, The Arabist, 2 April 2013. Available at: http://arabist.
net/blog/2013/4/2/the-zaatari-refugee-camp.html.
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men are issues host countries, the international community, and aid organisations could 
address directly with additional policies and programming.18 Funding that is designated 
to ‘engage men and boys’ is often billed as ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE); and 
while undoubtedly doing important work, such designations continue to envision men as 
distant, dangerous and potentially something other than what they are.
Understanding the decisions made by Syrian men to flee the fighting involve complex 
moral choices about who they are as Syrians, as men and as members of  families, people 
with dreams and ambitions and people who have land, jobs, businesses and who love for 
their country. If  they are only intermittently being allowed to flee Syria and into host 
countries, are such policies encouraging men to stay and thus get embroiled in the con-
flict? Is the humanitarian aid community, by virtue of  not seeing men as vulnerable and 
not seeing men as civilians, participating in prolonging the conflict? By seeing value in the 
choices that men make not to fight, those who see themselves playing a role as humanitar-
ian actors can help to develop structures that provide men with more options to remove 
themselves from the fighting and thus play some role in limiting conflict. 
While recognising the funding shortfalls for assisting Syrian refugees and host countries, 
the benefits of  targeting humanitarian support for all civilians, including men, can remove 
unaccompanied men and young men in particular, from being seen as dangerous in the 
eyes of  host governments. How might we understand the challenges they face fleeing 
conscription and in choosing not to fight? And what are their ways of  thinking about 
the fighting in Syria, and how might programmes be developed to allow them to remove 
themselves from the fighting?
In specific, humanitarian and other aid programming could work with the governments of 
host countries to develop programmes for men and provide training for security personnel 
at border posts to make sure unaccompanied men and boys can flee Syria and become 
contributing members of  camps and urban areas in which refugees reside. Psychosocial 
and community support could include outreach to men living alone or with their families, 
increased subsidies from the international community for volunteerism and vocational 
training and accredited secondary and higher education opportunities in neighbouring 
countries. Most importantly, the international community needs to prevent a lack of  tar-
geted programming from exacerbating vulnerabilities and creating a situation where men 
of  fighting age are confronted once again with the danger of  becoming entangled in the 
conflict in Syria, rather than contributing to the country’s future that lies beyond the con-
flict. Ultimately, we need to remember the long-term benefits of  ending the conflict and 
subsequent displacement of  people across borders. 
18  Lewis Turner, ‘Explaining the (non-)Encampment of  Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour 
Market in Lebanon and Jordan’, Mediterranean Politics 20/3 (2015), pp. 386–404.
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Introduction 
Syria can be described as both a refuge state and a refugee producing nation. This modern 
historical fact has had a profound influence on the way that neighbouring states and their 
people have responded and reacted to the current humanitarian crisis. The international 
humanitarian aid regime in its 21st century incarnation has again been caught out, unpre-
pared and curiously unresponsive to the perceptions and aspirations of  both those seeking 
refuge and the host communities providing it. This paper sets out to explore the disparity 
in perceptions and aspirations among forced migrants, members of  hosting communities 
and humanitarian aid practitioners and policymakers. It is based on fieldwork in Turkey, 
Lebanon and Jordan between September 2014 and September 2015. 
The Making of a Refuge State in Syria
Five times in modern history, Syria and its peoples have received and accommodated mas-
sive influxes of  forced migrants. In the 100 years between 1850 and 1950, Syria received 
several million forced migrants from the contested borderlands with the Imperial Russian 
and Ottoman Empires. At the close of  the Crimean War (1853–1856), and the following 
two Ottoman–Russian Wars in the 1860s and 1880s, more than 3 million forced migrant 
Tatars, Circassians, Chechens, Abkhaza, Abaza, and other related ethnic groups entered 
the Ottoman provinces of  Rumeli (the Balkans), Anatolia, and the Arab regions of  Bilad 
al Sham (Greater Syria). 
As World War I drew to a close, as many as half  a million Armenians found refuge in 
Syria settling among their co-religionists in Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut. When the 
modern Republic of  Turkey was established in 1923, 10,000 Kurds from Turkey fled 
across the border into Syria, choosing to escape from the forced secularism of  Kemal 
Ataturk’s new Turkey. The Inter-War French mandate over Syria saw a continuation of 
these processes, with waves of  Assyrian Christians entering the country in the 1930s seek-
ing asylum and safety after the British had given up their mandate over Iraq in 1932. All 
these forced migrants were granted citizenship in the new Syrian state. And then, in the 
late 1940s, Syria was the safe harbour for over 100,000 Palestinians fleeing the ‘Nakba’ at 
the time of  the creation of  the state of  Israel. Between 1975 and 1989, Syria harboured 
hundreds of  thousands of  Lebanese fleeing civil war in their homeland. It is hardly an 
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exaggeration to say that the modern ‘truncated’ Syrian state, carved out of  Greater Syria 
by the League of  Nations in 1920 and granted full independence in 1946, was a place 
of  refuge for hundreds of  thousands, if  not millions, of  ethno-religious groups uprooted 
from their homelands near and far as a result of  war, arbitrary lines drawn across maps, 
and ethno-sectarian strife. 
In the summer of  2006, Syria admitted over a million Lebanese refugees when Israel 
invaded south Lebanon. A year later the steady trickle of  Iraqis seeking refuge in Syria 
became a flood when over 1 million Iraqi refugees entered the country and were hosted 
as ‘temporary guests’ and brother Arabs. As long as they and other refugees from Afghan-
istan, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea conducted their business without crossing any Syrian 
Baʿathist state ‘red lines’, they were tolerated and treated in much the same manner as 
Syrian citizens. The Syrian institution of  hospitality meant that, until 2011, the interna-
tional humanitarian aid regime did not have to deal with a mass influx into Europe of 
Iraqi or other refugees from the Arab world. 
The Unmaking of a Refuge State in Syria
Then, a decade into the 21st century, Syria disintegrated into extreme violence. The speed 
with which the country emptied of  nearly 20 percent of  its population left the humani-
tarian aid regime in turmoil as agencies struggled to respond to the growing displacement 
crisis on Syria’s borders. Each country bordering Syria has responded differently to this 
complex emergency: Turkey set up its own refugee camps for the most vulnerable groups, 
but generally supported self-settlement and Syrian civil society activism; Lebanon refused 
to allow the international humanitarian aid regime to set up formal refugee camps and 
counted on civil society engagement; Jordan prevaricated for nearly a year and then 
insisted upon the setting up of  a massive United Nations (UN) refugee camp to keep the 
forced migrants near the border and away from major population centres.1 
Why is Syria’s modern history of  relevance to the humanitarian disaster which unfolded 
in 2011? The UN estimates are that over 70 percent of  Syrian refugees crossing inter-
national borders are self-settling in cities, towns and villages where they have social and 
economic networks. This ‘social capital’ has long historic roots that go back to the late 
period of  the Ottoman Empire and its reforms (Tanzimat) which encouraged horizontal 
ties across ethno-religious communities (millets), vestiges of  which continued to character-
ise community and individual relations across modern state borders up to the present era.
In Turkey, most refugees are clustered in the southern region of  the country bordering 
Syria, particularly the Hatay region which was part of  Syria until 1938. Circular migra-
tion in and out of  the region – into Syrian ‘moderate opposition’-held territory is tolerated 
1 Lebanon and Jordan have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention that sets out principles and respon-
sibilities of  states in providing protection and asylum for those deemed to fit the definition of  ‘refugee’ 
according to the 1951 Statutes and the 1967 Protocol. Although Turkey has signed the 1951 Conven-
tion, it has reserved its interpretation of  the Convention to apply only to Europeans seeking refuge/
asylum in Turkey.
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by the Turkish government. Despite a general rejection of  encampment among those 
fleeing, some 25–30 percent of  the Syrian refugee flow is directed into camps. 
In Lebanon, the UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) effort to get an agreement to set up 
refugee camps for Syrians was rejected by the government. Instead, informal settlements 
often based on pre-existing relationships with ‘gang-master’ agricultural hierarchies, 
began to proliferate in the interior agricultural region of  Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and 
the Akkar region in the north. By 2015 there were over 1,000 informal settlements of  dis-
placed Syrians on the margins of  towns and villages, and in unused or fallow agricultural 
fields. These arrangements were generally accompanied by patron–client relationships 
rather than the more transparent management of  humanitarian aid as espoused by the 
international regime. 
In Jordan, since late 2012, self-settled refugees from Syria found to be ‘illegally’ working 
were ‘deported’ into Zaʿtari camp or other UNHCR settlement. There was no escape 
from these camps other than by paying to be ‘sponsored’ by a Jordanian, marrying off  a 
daughter – often underage – to a Jordanian, or being smuggled out and re-entering the 
liminal state of  irregular status. 
Mass Influx Precariously Contained Regionally
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have each established a variety of  temporary measures to 
deal with this crisis. However, in no case have the displaced or the host communities been 
consulted. Even the needs assessments which the international humanitarian world and its 
NGO partners rely on for determining service provisions are based on Western concerns 
and validate the perceptions of  the service providers rather than the ‘targeted communities’. 
Discrepancies are rapidly becoming visible and tensions have emerged between host com-
munities, displaced Syrians and humanitarian policymakers. The situation is unsustainable 
and threatens to test the humanitarian aid regimes’ preferred ‘solution’ of  containing the 
crisis within the region. Without significant changes in policy and practice, Syria’s forced 
migrants will continue to leave the region in search of  protection, work and education.
Frontiers in the immediate region of  the former Ottoman Empire have always been 
porous. Historic ties between communities across borderlands or to imagined home-
lands in the Balkans and the Caucuses have meant that movement has constantly crossed 
frontier zones. The Circassian, Tatar, Kosovar, Bulgarian, Albanian, and other commu-
nities dispersed throughout the former Ottoman lands still maintain ties, memories and 
imagined links to places beyond the immediate neighbouring refuge states of  Turkey, 
Lebanon and Jordan. The contemporary Western policies of  ‘containment in the region’, 
as a humanitarian template developed over decades of  experience in southeast Asia and 
Africa is being challenged by displaced Syrians on the Eastern Mediterranean. The policy 
has not kept up with the global nature of  mobility and movement, nor with the spe-
cific contextual matters among refugees and their host communities. Containment in the 
region is precarious. It is also at odds with the rights of  human beings to seek asylum when 
they are no longer protected by the state in which they live.
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Many Syrians in Lebanon feel that they are not refugees but rather temporarily displaced 
and awaiting the opportunity to return home. However, they sense a growing level of 
social discrimination, especially in Beirut. In addition, they now articulate a fear that the 
Lebanese population associates them with criminality. Many of  the Syrians in Lebanon 
had been working there for many years in construction and agriculture. The imposition of 
illegal night curfews and vigilantism in over 40 municipalities has left many Syrians afraid 
to go out at night or to mix with the Lebanese population. Further, older Syrian children 
are being pulled out of  schooling in order to work. 
Most of  the initial wave of  Syrians entering Jordan had kinship ties or well established 
social networks in northern Jordan, and the hosting of  this initial influx was regarded as 
generous and hospitable. However, the Jordanian government has since restricted entry 
and prevented some from entering (unaccompanied male youths) and returned others 
(Palestinian refugees from Syria). The host community in Jordan is bombarded with infor-
mation regarding the negative influence of  Syrian refugees – although the evidence shows 
that Syrians are making a contribution to the overall economy. There is also widespread 
acknowledgement that Syrians are skilled workmen, especially carpenters. Employment in 
the informal sector causes stress for Syrians as, without work permits, they may be arrested, 
even though they are largely replacing Egyptian, not Jordanians, in the workforce. 
Syrians in Turkey come from a variety of  backgrounds and social classes. Many Syrians 
are concerned with the negative imagery of  ‘dirty’ and ‘uncouth’ Arabs, commonly artic-
ulated by middle class Turks. However, many local Turkish hosting communities have 
recognised the needs of  the refugees and the third sector, including religious organisations, 
has provided crucial assistance. Poor communication and understanding of  the situation of 
Syrians led to demonstrations, arrests and a dozen or so deaths in 2014. Turkey, with a pop-
ulation of  74 million, is hosting over 2 million refugees from Syria. It beggars belief  that 
Europe, with a population of  over 500 million, is unwilling to take a share of  the burden. 
Conclusion
History matters. The varied responses to the crisis by Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan can 
be linked to historical social and political relations between Syria and its neighbours. 
Disparity in perceptions between policymakers, practitioners and host communities is 
widespread, but not equally so in the three countries. International aid workers, national 
NGO workers and local host community members all have differing relations with refu-
gees from Syria. 
In Lebanon, the consociational shape of  governance, and at times actual lack of  a gov-
ernment, has caused paralysis in the UN humanitarian aid system. Thus, effective relief 
programmes for the most vulnerable of  Syrians were very late to start, causing begging 
and other ‘negative coping’ strategies (pulling children out of  school to work, moving into 
structures unfit for habitation, and relying on former agricultural ‘gang’ masters’ [shawish] 
to be the interface between the UN humanitarian relief  system and refugees themselves). 
In Jordan, the majority of  Syrian refugees are closely linked to the Jordanian population, 
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especially in the north where tribal ties are strong. Education opportunities are limited 
and many Syrian children are only able attend second-shift schools with an inferior cur-
riculum and reduced hours. 
In Turkey, refugee camps set up by the Turkish emergency relief  organisation (AFAD) 
without UN assistance have proved effective. These settlements are open – refugees may 
enter and leave on a daily basis. By January 2015, it was clear that Turkey – of  all the 
three countries – was far more humane and practical in its approach to the mass influx of 
refugees from Syria. Social discrimination was at its least public expression and Sufi-based 
organisations were active in providing assistance at the local community level – mainly 
food and accommodation. This was not found in Lebanon or Jordan despite the closer 
linguistic and social ties. 
The disparity in perceptions among refugees, members of  local hosting communities and 
practitioners is most pronounced in Lebanon and Jordan where the international human-
itarian aid regime is the most active. The engagement of  UN frameworks in creating 
an architecture of  assistance built upon templates developed over the past few decades 
largely among agrarian and poor developing countries. Such policy and practice does not 
fit easily into the middle-income countries of  the Eastern Mediterranean with a refugee 
population that is largely educated and middle-class. Without a serious effort to make the 
‘humanitarian solutions’ fit the context of  the Middle East, success will continue to be 
muted, at best, and damaging at worst. It is ironic that Turkey, the one country which has 
not requested assistance from UNHCR, seems to have managed the process of  providing 
assistance without undermining refugee agency and dignity. 
The separate histories of  Turkey and the countries of  the Levant have obviously contrib-
uted to the disparities in perceptions and, aspirations among refugees, host community 
members and practitioners in each to the three countries. The moderated engagement of 
the international humanitarian aid regime in Turkey, but not in Lebanon and Jordan, has 
also contributed to some of  the disparities. Global templates for humanitarian assistance 
built from experiences in very different contexts and among populations of  significantly 
different make-up are not easily integrated into Middle Eastern concepts of  refuge, hos-
pitality, and charity. The close social ties and networks of  Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan 
but not in Turkey (with the exception of  the Hatay), have meant that the initial generosity 
of  hosting among relatives in a wide social network has more rapidly given way to hostility 
and discrimination, unlike the situation in Turkey where fewer Syrians had social networks 
and the original hosting was based on a religious and ethical sense of  duty to the stranger. 
Many refugees, members of  host communities and practitioners have articulated steps 
which the international community could take to ameliorate conditions, halt a mass 
departure from the region, and create conditions for future return to Syria. Most dis-
placed Syrians preferred self-settlement and close interaction with host communities to 
separate and isolated encampment. Local community drop-in centres offering opportuni-
ties for non-formal education, language training, and technical training for the displaced 
Syrians and the local community were also seen as important measures to help local 
accommodation and give a future to the current lost generation of  youth. 
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Above all, humanitarian access to Europe, or temporary protection, not resettlement, 
is the main aspiration for those who feel their situation is unsustainable – to work and 
educate their youth until such a time as they can return to Syria. In view of  the growing 
hostility in some parts of  the Eastern Mediterranean alongside depletion of  savings and 
illegality of  employment, Syrians are increasingly looking to Europe for opportunities to 
save their youth from becoming a ‘lost generation’.
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Forced Displacement: An Increasingly Prominent Global Issue 
In recent years, forced displacement has become an increasingly prominent global issue. 
The changing scale, complexity and rapid pace of  evolution of  forced displacement have 
challenged governance at the global, regional and country levels. There is an increasing 
recognition of  the need to address the underlying causes of  movements, to better protect 
those on the move, to mitigate growing regional security concerns, and to find improved 
ways of  funding international aid for the prevention of  conflicts and addressing the con-
sequences of  forced displacement. 
Ten years ago, there were 38 million people displaced by conflict, today there are over 
65 million.1 While the world is witnessing an increase in new conflicts, old ones are not 
being resolved. Durable solutions are few and far between: globally, less than 1 percent 
of  refugees are resettled to a third country;2 and the number of  returning refugees has 
remained rather low in recent years. As a result, major refugee displacement crises last for 
an average of  17 years.3
Many reckon that in a world generating $78 trillion in annual global wealth, insufficient 
resources have been devoted to preventing conflict and adequately addressing the conse-
quences of  forced displacement. The world humanitarian aid budget for 2014 was the 
largest ever recorded, but it also created the biggest shortfall in history, with just 62 per-
cent of  the total needs identified by its annual appeals process actually being funded.4
The world and the UN recognise the fact that forced displacement has become a prior-
ity global issue deserving urgent attention, an issue now finding the place it deserves in 
the agendas of  the Group of  Seven (G7) and the Group of  Twenty (G20) meetings and 
UN International conferences. In 2016 alone such important high-level summits include 
the London Conference on Supporting Syria and the Region held in early February, the 
30 March High-Level Summit on Resettlement and Alternative Pathways of  Admission 
for Syrian Refugees, the World Humanitarian Summit, the upcoming September UN 
1  ‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015’, UNHCR (June 2016), p. 2. Available at: http://www.
unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html. 
2  ‘Solutions: Resettlement’, UNHCR. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/resettlement.html.
3  ‘Who We Help’, UNHCR. Available at: http://www.unrefugees.org/what-we-do/who-we-help.
4  Harriet Grant, ‘UN Agencies ‘Broke and Failing’ in Face of  Ever-Growing Refugee Crisis,’ The 
Guardian, 6 September 2015. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/refu-
gee-crisis-un-agencies-broke-failing.
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High-Level Summit on Large-Scale Movements of  Refugees and Migrants and President 
Obama Leaders’ Summit on Refugees.
A Region in the Eye of the Forced Displacement Storm
There are 19.5 million displaced people in the Middle East and North Africa region,5 
which continues to host a disproportionate number of  conflicts, with the Syrian crisis the 
largest refugee emergency since World War II.
Whilst over 500,000 Syrian refugees have reached the shores of  Europe since 2015, the 
overwhelming majority of  Syrian refugees, 4.8 million, are still in the Middle East region, 
of  whom 253,000 were registered in 2016. There are 13.5 million people in need inside 
Syria, of  whom 6.5 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs).6 In Lebanon, one in 
four persons is a refugee. If  the European Union and its over 500 million population were 
to host a similar proportion of  Syrian refugees, this would mean 125 million Syrian refu-
gees in Europe. This number is to be contrasted with the total number of  application for 
asylum in the EU in 2015: 1.26 million.7
Considering the situation of  Syrian refugees in the Middle East region six years into the 
conflict, it is clear that the overwhelming majority is contending with increasing disil-
lusionment in the absence of  any immediate prospect for a peace agreement in Syria, 
impoverishment and increasing precariousness.
In late 2015, UNHCR and the World Bank released a joint report entitled ‘The Welfare 
of  Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon’.8 The report found that 7 in 
10 registered Syrian refugees living in Jordan and Lebanon could be considered poor. 
This number increases to 9 in 10 refugees if  the poverty lines used by the respective host 
countries are considered. Regarding education, there is a real risk of  creating a ‘lost gen-
eration’, with 52 percent of  Syrian refugee children (5–17 years old) – or 708,000 – now 
out of  school.9
Further, as poverty and insecurity rise, negative coping mechanisms have also increased, 
including child labour, child marriage, and survival sex. The percentage of  households 
employing crisis coping strategies across the refugee-hosting countries rose from 30 per-
cent in 2014 to 52 percent in 2015.10
5  ‘UNHCR Statistics: The World in Numbers’, UNHCR. Available at: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/
overview.
6  ‘UNHCR Data Portal’, UNHCR. Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.
7  ‘Record Number of  Over 1.2 Million First Time Asylum Seekers Registered in 2015’, EuroStat Press 
Release (March 2016). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04
032016-AP-EN.pdf.
8  Paolo Verme, Chiara Gigliarano, Christina Wieser, Kerren Hedlund, Marc Petzoldt and Marco San-
tacroce, ‘The Welfare of  Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon’, World Bank and UNHCR 
(December 2015). 
9  ‘Press Release: $250 Million Secured for Syrian Refugee Education’, UN Special Envoy for Global Education, 
12 January 2016. Available at: http://educationenvoy.org/press-release-un-press-briefing/.
10  ‘Vulnerability Assessment of  Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2015’, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP (2015). 
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In hosting 4.8 million Syria refugees, neighbouring countries have not only displayed 
outstanding generosity, but also contributed to a global public good. But these countries 
are reaching a saturation point. Countries in the region have been impacted by the Syrian 
conflict in terms of  export of  insecurity and significant loss on trade and tourism reve-
nues. They have also devoted a significant level of  national resources to contend with the 
presence of  a large Syrian refugee population.
In January 2016, in its Quarterly Economic Brief, the World Bank estimated that the 
influx of  more than 630,000 Syrian refugees has cost Jordan over $2.5 billion per year.11 
This amounts to 6 percent of  the country’s GDP and one-fourth of  its government’s 
annual revenues. The Jordanian Ministry of  Education also recently said that the annual 
cost of  education services offered to Syrian refugee children in Jordan’s schools is esti-
mated at 250 million Jordanian Dinar (around $353 million).12 
In Lebanon, the negative effect of  the Syrian conflict has been massive in security, political 
and economic terms. In addition, the presence of  a large Syrian refugee population has 
had a marked impact on public services including education, health, energy, water, waste 
collection and treatment and infrastructure. The population of  Lebanon has increased by 
16 percent, yet GDP growth was at just 1 percent in 2014 – a nine-point drop since the 
beginning of  the conflict. 
Turkey remains the largest refugee-hosting country in the world, currently hosting 2.7 
million Syrian refugees and almost 250,000 refugees and asylum seekers of  other nation-
alities.13 The strain of  hosting millions of  refugees for a protracted period of  time has 
taken its toll, stretching the capacities of  municipalities and host communities, with Turkey 
indicating that it has spent over $10 billion over the past five years.14
In 2015, funding shortfalls, leading most critically to a significant forced reduction in the 
provision of  food e-vouchers, brought the situation to a breaking point in the region with 
dramatic movements towards Europe. In hindsight, this phenomenon should have come 
as a surprise to no one. With growing debts and increased impoverishment of  refugees, 
we saw a clean rupture of  the first line response in host countries in the region, most likely 
in an irremediable fashion. Since mid-2015, Syrians, a significant percentage of  whom 
from Syria itself, have been leaving the region because of  loss of  hope and a dramatic 
continued process of  impoverishment.
Available at: https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=10006.
11  ‘MENA Quarterly Economic Brief ’, World Bank (January 2016). Available at: http://www.worldbank.
org/en/region/mena/publication/mena-quarterly-economic-brief.
12  ‘Annual Cost of  Education Syrian Refugees’, Jordan Petra News Agency (March 2016). Available at: http://
www.petra.gov.jo/Public_News/Nws_NewsDetails.aspx?lang=2&site_id=1&NewsID=242859&-
CatID=13.
13  ‘Global Focus – Turkey’, UNHCR. Available at: http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2544.
14  Mehmet Cetingulec, ‘How Long Can Turkey Afford Growing Refugee Bill?’, Al-Monitor, 13 May 
2016. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-syria-growing-refu-
gee-bill.html.
64 The Long-Term Challenges of Forced Migration: Perspectives from Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq
Fully recognising the protracted nature of  the Syrian conflict, host countries went one step 
further in the provision of  this public good at the Supporting Syria and the Region Con-
ference in London held in February 2016 by making new commitments for livelihoods and 
education for all Syrian refugees in tandem with the international community. The London 
Conference introduced a new formula of  ‘commitments for policy change’ focusing on 
opening up labour markets and increasing economic opportunities for refugees and host 
communities. In turn, participants agreed to support host countries in areas such as pref-
erential access to external markets, including the revision of  tariffs, access to concessional 
financing and increased external support for public and private sectors job creation.
Of  related interest, in January, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a report 
indicating that GDP levels will eventually rise in Europe as a result of  the refugee influx.15 
The IMF found that rapid labour market inclusion is key to reducing the fiscal cost asso-
ciated with the inflow of  asylum seekers.
Need for a Fairer, more Equitable Global Responsibility Sharing
At this critical juncture, and today more than ever, there is a need for greater level of 
international solidarity and a more equitable, fair and sustainable responsibility sharing 
for supporting Syrian refugees in several respects.
First, the disbursement of  the outstanding and unprecedented level of  pledges  – in the 
form of  $12 billion in grants and $40 billion in loans – committed by world leaders at the 
London Conference for the immediate, medium, and long-term needs of  Syria and the 
region, must be expedited. As it stands, the successive regional refugee responses coordi-
nated by UNHCR since 2012, including the most recent innovative Regional Refugee 
and Resilience Plan (3RP), have only been funded at a 64 percent level.
Second, the transition from an essential humanitarian response from 2011 to 2014 focused 
on most immediate life-saving assistance towards a more long-term resilience-based 
approach must be pursued with sustained vigour. As of  2015, an innovative initiative was 
set in motion blending humanitarian and resilience responses in support to refugees and 
local institutions and communities under the 3RP. The London Conference provided fur-
ther impetus to this strategic shift through policy change commitments. However, without 
sufficient funding, the policy changes agreed to in London in support of  livelihoods and 
education – such as offering access to education for all refugee children starting with the 
2017–2018 school year – cannot be realised.
Third, renewed global efforts are required to increase opportunities for Syrian refugees 
outside the immediate region through legal routs in the form of  resettlement, as well as 
pathways such as student visas, labour mobility schemes and family reunification. Fol-
lowing the Summit for Legal Pathways for Syrian Refugees held on 30 March 2016 in 
Geneva, many countries offered to further increase their global resettlement programmes 
15  Shekhar Aiyar et al, ‘The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges’, International Monetary Fund 
(January 2016). Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1602.pdf.
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this year and in the coming years. A number of  states affirmed their commitment to 
family reunification, and several Latin American and European countries announced 
the establishment of  new humanitarian visa programmes, or the expansion of  existing 
ones. Thirteen states confirmed scholarships and student visas for Syrian refugees. Whilst 
aiming to reach a target of  10 percent of  registered Syrian refugees, the current number 
of  legal pathway places has reached 200,000. 
Four, ‘frontline states’ are playing a vital role in today’s world, as pillars of  regional sta-
bility, and they should be prioritised for development assistance and structural support. 
Yet, in many cases, this had not been occurring up until recently. As middle-income coun-
tries, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, were not eligible for financial structural support of  a 
concessional nature. As of  late, the World Bank has made very significant headways in 
developing such financial instruments and securing donors’ commitment.16
Five, global responsibility sharing means that as wide a number of  states as possible should 
be contributing. Currently, there is a disproportionate reliance on refugee-hosting states 
and a handful number of  donor countries. In 2015, 76 percent of  UNHCR’s overall 
income was provided by 10 donors. While UNHCR encourages its ‘traditional’ donors to 
give even more, what is critically needed is an expansion of  countries willing to give. Also, 
given the number of  conflicts occurring in Muslim countries, the potential of  Islamic 
social finance is to be fully explored. The 2016 UN High-Level Report on Humanitarian 
Financing has prioritised the need to expand the traditional donor base to tap into new 
sources of  wealth, along with expanding partnerships with businesses and the private 
sector. Businesses and the private sector can also assist with innovation, modernisation of 
practices and creativity.
And finally, six, another essential component of  a fairer and more equitable responsibility 
sharing is a coherent, well-coordinated and predictable European Union (EU) response 
for refugees, including Syrian refugees, of  which the recent EU–Turkey agreement and 
promise of  significant EU financial support in the range of  $6 billion can only be one 
component. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, only a political solution will bring an end to the conflict in Syria. The current 
peace process must be given full support by the international community.
However, in the absence of  any imminent peace prospect in Syria, it is essential to give 
traction to the transition towards a more longer-term resilience approach to assist Syrian 
refugees in the region and beyond, pending the time when conditions in Syria would lend 
themselves to voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity. The London Conference with 
the level of  international mobilisation it generated, building from the previously import-
ant Kuwait Conferences, was a very important milestone to this end.
16  ‘Support to the Middle East and North Africa Will Amount to US$20 billion in the Next Five Years’, 
Statement of  the World Bank President (February 2016).
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Failure to provide the required support to the region and ensure a more equitable respon-
sibility sharing equation in support to Syria refugees would come at an exorbitant cost for 
the refugees themselves, host countries, and ultimately, global security and stability. There 
should be no doubt in this respect. 
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